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Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality 
Guidance in Insider Trading 
Joan MacLeod Heminway* 
Issuers, investors, and regulators have struggled with applying 
the materiality test since the enactment of the securities laws.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading has been in the news on a relatively constant 
basis in the new millennium. Raj Rajaratnam and associates,2 Mark 
Cuban,3 and Martha Stewart4 have been among the many subjects 
of legal actions involving insider trading since the Enron debacle 
in 2002. Some of these cases have been garden-variety insider 
trading cases; others have exposed confusing and evolving 
elements of U.S. insider trading doctrine.5 Most recently, 
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 1. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, Remarks to the ‘SEC Speaks in 2008’ 
Program of the Practising Law Institute, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 8, 
2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch020808psa.htm. 
 2. See Press Release, SEC Charges Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Raj 
Rajaratnam with Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 16, 2009), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-221.htm; see also Press Release, SEC 
Obtains Record $92.8 Million Penalty Against Raj Rajaratnam, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 8, 2011), http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-233.htm. 
 3. See Press Release, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Mark 
Cuban, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2008/2008-273.htm. 
 4. See Press Release, SEC Charges Martha Stewart, Broker Peter 
Bacanovic with Illegal Insider Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 4, 
2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-69.htm; see also Press Release, 
SEC Charges Martha Stewart, Broker Peter Bacanovic with Illegal Insider 
Trading, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 7, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2006/2006-134.htm.  
 5. See generally, e.g., MARTHA STEWART’S LEGAL TROUBLES (Joan 
MacLeod Heminway ed., 2007) (exploring, especially in chapters 1, 5, and 10, 
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congressional hearings on the STOCK Act6—a bill providing for 
an express congressional prohibition on insider trading—have made 
headlines.7 Public reporting in connection with both recent legal 
actions and the introduction and passage of the STOCK Act also 
has brought to the fore long-debated questions about insider 
trading doctrine in the United States, including the unsettled nature 
of the system of regulation.8 This article urges the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)—or, absent action by the 
SEC, the federal judiciary—to adopt clarifying guidance on 
materiality—one unclear area of insider trading law. 
                                                                                                             
 
various uncertainties in insider trading policy and doctrine exposed in 
connection with the SEC insider trading enforcement action brought against 
Martha Stewart); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden 
Fruit: A New Story of Eve, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1017 (using the Stewart case 
to identify unclear aspects of U.S. insider trading law); Anthony Michael Sabino 
& Michael A. Sabino, From Chiarella to Cuban: The Continuing Evolution of 
the Law of Insider Trading, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 673 (2011) 
(describing the uncertain state of the requisite breach of a duty of trust and 
confidence after the trial and appellate court opinions in the Cuban case). 
 6. See Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, S. 2038, 112th 
Cong. (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112s2038eah/ 
pdf/BILLS-112s2038eah.pdf (House amendment of Senate bill, adopted on 
February 9, 2012). 
 7. See Paul Kane, Ethics reform bill to ban insider trading by Congress 
members, executive branch passed by House, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ethics-reform-bill-to-ban-
insider-trading-by-congress-members-executive-branch-passed-by- house /2012/ 
02/09/gIQAV3MS1Q_story.html; Robert Pear, House Passes Bill Banning 
Insider Trading by Members of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/us/politics/house-passes-bill-banning-
insider-trading-by-members-of-congress.html. 
 8. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Steve Cohen says insider trading rules are 
“vague,” REUTERS, Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/13/ us-
sac-cohen-deposition-idUSTRE7BC1UJ20111213; David N. Lawrence et al., 
Insider Trading 2011: How Technology and Social Networks Have ‘Friended’ 
Access to Confidential Information, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, May 11, 2011, 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2776 (noting that “the 
precise conduct under the definition of insider trading has always been vague”); 
Jonathan Macey, Congress’s Phony Insider-Trading Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
13, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020341 
3304577088881987346976.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEADTop (describing 
current insider trading rules as “broad and vague”) [hereinafter Phony Insider-
Trading]; Jonathan Macey, Deconstructing the Galleon Insider Trading Case, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704529204576256754289698630.html (observing that “[f]or 
decades, the SEC has kept the insider-trading rules vague and undefined.”) 
[hereinafter Deconstructing]; Frank C. Razzano, Insider Trading: Ambiguous 
Statute as Warning, BLOOMBERG L. REP., June 20, 2011, available at 
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=2140. 
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Adoption of this materiality guidance would affect the 
discretion of enforcement agents in (and judicial review of) insider 
trading actions. Accordingly, the remainder of this introduction 
lays a foundation for the proposed guidance by describing the 
enforcement discretion, judicial deference, and doctrinal contexts 
in which the guidance would operate, before establishing a few 
premises from this author’s earlier work in which that guidance is 
grounded. The article then proceeds (before briefly concluding) to 
propose the desired materiality guidance, identify the SEC as the 
most appropriate rulemaking body to adopt the guidance, and 
suggest a specific form in which the guidance should be issued. 
A. A Matter of Enforcement Discretion 
The SEC, historically a primary enforcement agent in insider 
trading actions, has asserted a strong role in shaping the unsettled 
components of insider trading law in the United States. Because 
the SEC has enforcement authority and because various aspects of 
U.S. insider trading law are susceptible of multiple interpretations, 
the SEC can (and does) assess the facts and circumstances of 
individual transactions and, after the fact, call some of those 
transactions into question by pursuing enforcement activities that 
explore and settle open doctrinal questions.9 The SEC is not alone 
among enforcement agents in exercising enforcement discretion in 
this manner.10 In arguing for more clarity in U.S. insider trading 
                                                                                                             
 9. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (in which the SEC 
unsuccessfully enforced Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 against a broker-dealer 
who traded on material nonpublic information, establishing the elements of 
tipper-tippee insider trading liability); SEC v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. 
Tex. 2009), vacated and remanded, 620 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. Tex. 2010) (in which 
the SEC sought validation of a novel interpretation of the duty of trust and 
confidence necessary for insider trading liability); see also Lawrence et al., 
supra note 8 (indicating that the SEC preserves enforcement discretion in the 
insider trading context so that it may pick and choose those it may prosecute); 
Macey, Deconstructing, supra note 8 (noting that ambiguity in insider trading 
rules “increases the SEC’s power and allows government lawyers to pick and 
choose among prosecution targets.”). 
 10. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (in which the U.S. 
Department of Justice successfully prosecuted a lawyer for insider trading on the 
basis of his misappropriation of material nonpublic information, validating the 
misappropriation theory of insider trading liability); Chiarella v. United States, 
445 U.S. 222 (1980) (in which the U.S. Department of Justice’s insider trading 
prosecution of a “markup man” at a legal and financial printer was unsuccessful 
because of the lack of a requisite duty of trust and confidence, establishing the 
classical theory of insider trading liability); see also Macey, Phony Insider-
Trading, supra note 8 (noting generally that “prosecutors enjoy almost 
unfettered discretion in deciding when and whom to prosecute”). 
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regulation, this article addresses an age-old jurisprudential 
question: how much enforcement discretion should the law afford 
the SEC and other enforcement agents (including the U.S. 
Department of Justice and private plaintiffs)?11 Increased ex ante 
clarity in insider trading rules affords individual and institutional 
actors more certainty in their transactional decision-making but 
decreases the capacity for ex post enforcement discretion. 
Recent, visible, significant insider trading enforcement and 
legislative activity12 makes the issue of enforcement discretion in 
insider trading important and timely. Accordingly, this article 
addresses one element of enforcement discretion in U.S. insider 
trading regulation and offers a solution. Specifically, this article 
seeks to identify the appropriate level and type of guidance that 
should be provided on the concept of materiality as it is defined 
and applied in U.S. insider trading law through the “disclose or 
abstain” rule.13 Greater guidance on materiality in the context of 
the “disclose or abstain” rule will limit enforcement discretion in 
insider trading regulation. However, this more limited discretion 
need not compromise the policies underlying U.S. insider trading 
regulation. In fact, if properly conceived and crafted (i.e., not as a 
bright-line rule, but as a process for decision-making under the 
current materiality standard), enhanced materiality guidance 
should create a more efficient, and potentially more effective, 
system of insider trading regulation consistent with underlying 
policy. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 11. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1971). Professor Davis writes: 
The central inquiry . . . is what can be done to assure that where law 
ends tyranny will not begin. More precisely, the central inquiry is what 
can be done that is not now done to minimize injustice from exercise of 
discretionary power. . . . [W]e should eliminate much unnecessary 
discretionary power and . . . we should do much more than we have 
been doing to confine, to structure, and to check necessary 
discretionary power. The goal is not the maximum degree of confining, 
structuring, and checking; the goal is to find the optimum degree for 
each power in each set of circumstances. 
Id. at 3–4. 
 12. See SEC Enforcement Actions: Insider Trading Cases, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml (last 
modified Oct. 6, 2011) (“Insider trading continues to be a high priority area for 
the SEC’s enforcement program. The SEC brought 53 insider trading cases in 
FY 2010 against 138 individuals and entities, a 43 percent increase in the 
number of filed cases from the prior fiscal year.”).  
 13. See infra Parts I.C and II. 
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B. A Matter of Deference 
In limiting enforcement discretion, materiality guidance also 
limits the range of discretion of the federal judiciary in materiality 
determinations. As a general matter (although courts apply the 
relevant law in various ways), federal courts in the United States 
defer to non-arbitrary, non-capricious legislative rulemaking by the 
SEC and other agencies if that rulemaking is expressly delegated to 
the agency and responds to and is consistent with the applicable 
legislative mandate.14 Moreover, where delegation of authority is 
not explicit, courts generally will defer to reasonable 
administrative agency interpretations of statutory provisions within 
the agency’s regulatory mandate.15 Finally, federal courts also 
afford deference to a federal agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulations.16 If the SEC were to adopt the materiality guidance 
proposed in this article, the federal courts may be bound to defer to 
the substance of that guidance. In evaluating the agency guidance 
proposed for adoption in this article, it is important to assess the 
extent to which judicial deference will be afforded to the guidance. 
It also is important in this context to determine the status of the 
guidance as an agency rule from the standpoint of the U.S. 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).17  
The APA recognizes a distinction between legislative rules 
and interpretative rules. The distinction is one of the most 
confusing in all of administrative law because legislative 
rules and interpretative rules differ along three different 
dimensions: the purpose of the rule, its legal effect, and the 
procedures used in promulgating the rule. In terms of 
purpose, a legislative rule can be defined as one that 
                                                                                                             
 14. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–844 (1984) 
(“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 15. See id. at 844 (footnote omitted) (“Sometimes the legislative delegation 
to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a 
case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for 
a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.”). 
 16. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–414 
(1945) (“Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a 
court must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if 
the meaning of the words used is in doubt. . . . [T]he ultimate criterion is the 
administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”). 
 17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2006). 
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articulates a new norm or modifies an existing norm, 
whereas an interpretative rule interprets or clarifies an 
existing norm. In terms of legal effect, a legislative rule is 
said to be legally binding on the regulated community the 
same way a statute is, while an interpretative rule may bind 
agency personnel, but does not bind the regulated 
community. In terms of procedure, legislative rules 
generally must be promulgated in accordance with public 
notice-and-comment procedures, whereas the APA exempts 
[interpretive] rules from these procedures. It is easy to see 
how the distinction between legislative and interpretative 
rules has led to confusion—different courts have 
distinguished between these rules on any and all of these 
three bases.18 
So, is the suggested materiality guidance a legislative rule or an 
interpretive rule (a form of nonlegislative rule) under the APA?19 
As a general matter, proposed guidance on materiality perhaps 
is best seen as an interpretive, rather than legislative, rule under the 
APA. However, the materiality guidance proposed in this article 
may be seen—or cast—as either a legislative or nonlegislative rule. 
It is not intended to provide “a new norm”20 or change “an existing 
norm.”21 Rather, it is intended to arrange existing norms into a 
more coherent framework for applying the existing materiality 
standard as established in decisional law. As a result, the guidance 
“interprets or clarifies an existing norm.”22 However, as envisioned 
in this article, the proffered materiality guidance—sets of 
                                                                                                             
 18. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 833, 903 (2001) (footnotes omitted). This explanation is useful (and helpful 
here), but it is not the only explanation of the distinction. For example, another 
scholar offers the following to explain the difference. 
A legislative rule is essentially an administrative statute—an exercise 
of previously delegated power, new law that completes an incomplete 
legislative design. Legislative rules frequently prescribe, modify, or 
abolish duties, rights, or exemptions. In contrast, nonlegislative rules 
do not exercise delegated lawmaking power and thus are not 
administrative statutes. Instead, they provide guidance to the public and 
to agency staff and decisionmakers. They are not legally binding on 
members of the public. 
Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 
DUKE L.J. 381, 383 (footnotes omitted). 
 19. A third possibility should be noted here: that of a policy—another form 
of nonlegislative rule. This option is addressed briefly infra note 189 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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alternating presumptions and per se rules addressing two different 
factual scenarios—is intended “to be legally binding on the 
regulated community the same way a statute”23 that engages those 
procedures would be (although it is not common to have statutes 
that engage serial presumptions to define an operative term). 
Accordingly, the status of the proposed materiality guidance as a 
legislative or interpretive rule under the APA is inconclusive. 
The way in which the SEC promulgates the guidance may 
affect its status as a legislative or interpretive rule.24  
When an agency has a choice to proceed legislatively or 
nonlegislatively, its contemporaneous description is the most 
reliable test of what it actually did. Because an agency can 
choose to interpret law or limit discretion through legislative 
rulemaking, nonlegislative rulemaking, adjudication, or 
other techniques, it is appropriate to accept the agency’s 
description of which alternative it chose at the time it made 
the choice. Deference to the agency’s label also promotes 
certainty and predictability of result and provides agencies 
with reasonable assurance that reviewing courts will honor 
their decision to proceed nonlegislatively. Thus, an agency’s 
contemporaneously-adopted description of its intention and 
desired legal effect is and should be of central importance in 
characterizing its product.25 
Although courts are not bound by the agency’s description of its 
own rule as legislative or nonlegislative, that description can be 
helpful guidance to the court in exercising its decision-making 
authority.26 
SEC interpretive guidance on materiality should be given 
deference by the federal courts, whether it is viewed as a 
legislative rule or an agency interpretation of the congressional or 
SEC rules embodying U.S. federal insider trading prohibitions. 
Congress delegated broad express authority to the SEC to make 
rules under Section 10(b) (“Section 10(b)”) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “1934 Act”).27 These rules 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. 
 24. See Asimow, supra note 18, at 389 (“In many instances, an agency can 
choose to proceed legislatively or nonlegislatively, and there can be little dispute 
over the characterization of the resulting product: The agency explicitly declares 
that it intends to act either legislatively or nonlegislatively and that declared 
intention corresponds with the legal effect of the rule.”). 
 25. Id. at 389–90 (footnotes omitted). 
 26. See id. at 390. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (2006) (making it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
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are the foundation for most U.S. federal insider trading 
regulation.28 Adding detail to the judicially constructed definition 
of materiality in a manner that better effectuates the purpose of 
insider trading regulation under Section 10(b) and related SEC 
rulemaking is neither arbitrary nor capricious and, by its nature, 
would be consistent with both the statutory provision and SEC 
rulemaking under the statute, as interpreted in decisional law. 
Federal courts should give effect to the SEC’s views on the 
application of materiality doctrine because it represents expert 
guidance on existing law and rules within the SEC’s area of 
authority. 
While federal court deference to SEC guidance on materiality 
constrains the freedom of judicial decision-making in materiality 
determinations, constraint is part of Congress’s statutory plan, in 
which it expressly delegated implementation of Section 10(b) to 
the SEC in the statute.29 This judicial deference to SEC guidance 
on materiality, like the limitation on enforcement discretion 
resulting from that guidance, need not compromise the policies 
underlying U.S. insider trading doctrine and holds the promise of 
creating a more efficient, and potentially more effective, system of 
regulation that is consistent with underlying policy. 
C. The Relevant Legal Doctrine: “Disclose or Abstain” and 
Materiality 
The judge-made “disclose or abstain” rule is the substantive 
focal point of U.S. insider trading regulation30 under Rule 10b-5,31 
the principal anti-fraud rule adopted by the SEC under Section 
                                                                                                             
 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations 
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors” (emphasis added)). 
 28. See infra Part I.C. 
 29. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading under the Restatement of 
the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (1993) (“The so-called disclose 
or abstain rule is the basic federal insider trading prohibition.”); Donna M. 
Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities Trading by 
Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1129, 1129 (1999) (“For more than thirty-eight years, the so-called ‘disclose or 
abstain’ rule has been an integral part of the insider trading prohibition imposed 
by the federal securities laws.”). 
 31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). The SEC has adopted two additional 
insider trading rules under its authority to make rules implementing Section 
10(b): Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b5-1 & 240.10b5-2. 
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10(b) (“Rule 10b-5”).32 The “disclose or abstain” rule provides that 
when an issuer of publicly traded securities33 or one of its 
insiders34 is in possession of undisclosed material information, the 
issuer or insider must either disclose the material information 
before trading in the issuer’s securities or abstain from trading in 
the issuer’s securities.35 Most insider trading claims are raised 
under Rule 10b-5 and involve the application and interpretation of 
this rule.36 Although the materiality of undisclosed information is 
quite clear in some cases; in others, materiality is contestable and 
may be determinative. It is this latter class of cases that motivates 
this article. 
The concept of materiality, which is central to the “disclose or 
abstain” rule,37 is defined by use of a broad, judicially constructed 
                                                                                                             
 32. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 33. Publicly traded securities, for these purposes, are securities that are 
registered under Section 12 of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78l. 
 34. In general, an “insider” is an individual or entity that has a relationship 
of “trust and confidence” with the issuer’s shareholders. Chiarella v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980). 
 35. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 30, at 4 (“A trader who possesses 
material, nonpublic information must either disclose it to the investment public 
before trading, or if he is unable to do so, must abstain from trading in the 
affected company’s securities.”); Jesse M. Fried, Insider Abstention, 113 YALE 
L.J. 455, 456 (2003) (“Under the duty to disclose or abstain, a person in 
knowing possession (or ‘aware’) of material nonpublic information must either 
disclose the information or abstain from trading when the other party to the 
transaction is entitled to know the information because of a fiduciary duty or 
other relationship of trust and confidence between them.”); Lynn A. Stout, The 
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market 
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 623 (1988) (“Federal 
law prohibits insiders from trading on the basis of nonpublic information not 
disclosed to the person with whom they are trading.”). 
 36. See Fried, supra note 35, at 456 (“The primary mechanism for 
regulating insider trading is the duty to ‘disclose or abstain,’ which arises under 
Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”). A violation of Section 
10(b) requires manipulative or deceptive conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
Contravention of the “disclose or abstain” rule constitutes the requisite 
deception. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path 
Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. 
REV. 1589, 1615 (1999) (“[I]nsider trading in violation of the disclose or abstain 
rule involves an element of deception.”); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities 
Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 562 (2011) (“The insider trading prohibition is often 
described as a ‘disclose or abstain’ rule because there is no deception, and thus 
no fraud, if the seller/buyer tells her counterparty about the particular inside 
information she uses to trade.”). 
37
 “The sine qua non of any insider trading claim is material nonpublic 
information.” Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider 
Trading: Legal Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring 
Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 151, 154 (2011). 
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standard.38 Specifically, under Rule 10b-5 (both within and outside 
of the insider trading context), a fact is material when there is a 
substantial likelihood that (a) a reasonable investor would find the 
fact important in making an investment decision or (b) disclosure 
of the fact would significantly alter the “total mix” of publicly 
available information.39 In the context of preliminary merger 
discussions, where consummation of the subject merger is 
uncertain, a more tailored test exists, in which the probability of 
the potential transaction occurring is weighed against the 
magnitude of the potential transaction.40 This balancing test is 
widely applied by courts, litigants, and other actors in other 
circumstances involving the disclosure or nondisclosure of current 
facts relating to contingent or speculative events.41 These facially 
simple articulations of a materiality standard make for difficult ex 
ante and ex post materiality determinations in many cases and 
allow for the exercise of significant enforcement discretion and 
hindsight bias by enforcement agents and judicial decision-
makers.42 
In an earlier article (the “Initial Materiality Article”), this 
author argued for additional substantive guidance for making 
                                                                                                             
 38. See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures 
to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned 
Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 107 (2000) (“[T]he materiality 
concept speaks broadly to require disclosure of any information that a 
‘reasonable shareholder’ would consider ‘important.’”). 
 39. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (applying, 
under Rule 10b-5, the alternative materiality formulations endorsed by the Court 
in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
 40. Id. at 239. 
 41. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1265 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (assessing the materiality of pending litigation); United States SEC v. 
Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1291 (9th Cir. 1996) (regarding the materiality of contingent 
liabilities); PPM Am. v. Marriott Corp., 853 F. Supp. 860, 868 (D. Md. 1994) 
(governing the materiality of a “major change in corporate form”); Wielgos v. 
Commonwealth Edison Co., 688 F. Supp. 331, 343 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (determining 
the materiality of a licensing board’s determination regarding an operating permit). 
The Basic Court expressly disclaimed that its adoption of the balancing test for the 
purpose of assessing the materiality of preliminary merger discussions constituted 
a broader adoption of the test for use in other circumstances involving contingent 
or speculative events. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 n.9. 
 42. See Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsight, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 773, 774 
(2004) (“Hindsight blurs the distinction between fraud and mistake. People 
consistently overstate what could have been predicted after events have unfolded 
. . . .”). Some judges disclaim that their materiality determinations are being 
made with the benefit of hindsight. See id. at 809. 
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materiality determinations in the insider trading context.43 The 
argument for change set forth in that article is based on both 
underlying policy and related shareholder value considerations,44 
although other rationales for additional materiality guidance in 
various stock-trading contexts also have been advanced. For 
example, arguments for enhancing materiality guidance under 
Regulation FD45 tend to focus on the fact that the lack of guidance 
fosters nondisclosure in circumstances where disclosure should be 
encouraged.46 Professor Steve Schwarcz effectively argues that the 
ambiguity in materiality determinations causes a temporal problem 
in that it forces corporations contemplating disclosure to choose 
between the maximization of short-term shareholder value and the 
maximization of long-term shareholder value.47 Professor James 
Park argues that imprecision in the existing qualitatively oriented 
materiality standard “expands the potential cost of defending 
securities fraud actions relating to accounting misstatements, 
especially for companies when they are issuing securities.”48 
Professor Steven Davidoff similarly proclaims that materiality is 
outdated and lacking in current investor relevance.49 Finally, 
accountants argue that the lack of a concrete definition of 
materiality creates undesirable behavioral effects.50 
                                                                                                             
 43. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of 
Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131 (2003) (reprinted at 
36 SEC. L. REV. 448 (2004)). 
 44. See id. at 1140–43 (summarizing these arguments); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Editor’s Introduction, 36 SEC. L. REV. 20 (2004) (noting the 
argument that ambiguity in the materiality standard used in insider trading 
regulation “is not necessary to promote the underlying policy goals of the insider 
trading prohibition and the uncertainty negatively impacts shareholder value”). 
 45. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100–103 (2012). 
 46. Laura Unger, Commissioner, Special Study: Regulation Fair Disclosure 
Revisited, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (December 2001), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm (last modified Oct. 29, 2003). 
 47. Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict 
Between Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005).  
 48. James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 
J. CORP. L. 513, 531 (2009). 
 49. Steven M. Davidoff, In Corporate Disclosure, a Murky Definition of 
Material, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, April 5, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/ 
04/05/in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-definition-of-material/ (“[T]he current 
disclosure scheme and its definition of materiality . . . is increasingly disconnected 
from the desires of investors and the marketplace. . . . The definition of materiality is 
from the 1980s, another time.”). 
 50. See Andrew A. Acito et al., Materiality Decisions and the Correction 
of Accounting Errors, 84 ACC’TING REV. 659, 660 (2009) (“The absence of 
bright-line criteria means that some materiality decisions may be strategic in 
their purpose”); see also id. at 664 (“Because GAAP does not provide bright-
line rules for determining materiality, management and auditors must jointly 
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These issues with the current materiality standard are 
particularly troublesome in the context of insider trading.  
[T]he concept of materiality as implemented in U.S. insider 
trading regulation has created unique planning problems for 
public companies and their insiders. This unique effect 
results from the fact that the judicially ordained law of 
insider trading in the United States acts as a transactional 
disclosure rule that, unlike other disclosure rules under the 
federal securities laws, provides issuers and their insiders 
with no specific disclosure content guidance.51 
The open-textured disclosure environment of insider trading in 
which materiality operates is of particular concern when it mixes 
with enforcement discretion. Enforcement agents may exercise 
their discretion to enforce insider trading prohibitions against some 
buyers, sellers, tippers, or tippees—and not others—for reasons 
unrelated to the policy objectives underlying insider trading 
regulation. For example, the SEC and other public enforcement 
agents may conduct their activities in part to develop the law of 
materiality.52 Also, in an earlier work, this author noted that the 
vagueness of aspects of the legal standard for insider trading 
liability under Rule 10b-5 (including the materiality element), 
when paired with the broad enforcement discretion available in the 
insider trading enforcement process, invites the introduction of 
                                                                                                             
 
negotiate a subjectively determined . . . materiality assessment on a case-by-case 
basis. This approach leaves open the possibility that some assessments are 
opportunistic and designed to achieve financial reporting and disclosure 
goals.”). 
 51. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1135. See also Peter J. Henning, Insider 
Trading Riddle: Why Do the Rich Risk It?, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, Apr. 4, 
2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/04/insider-trading-riddle-why-do-
the-rich-risk-it/?ref=securitiesandexchangecommission (identifying materiality 
as a key component of U.S. insider trading regulation). 
 52. See, e.g., Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 37, at 200 (“Because the law has 
developed in the courts . . . insider trading law is fluid and continues to evolve as 
markets grow, technology changes, and the DOJ and SEC press new theories of 
insider trading.”); David L. Kornblau & Brian B. Alexander, Recent Developments 
in the Law of Insider Trading and Material Nonpublic Information, SIFMA 
Compliance & Legal Society 2011 Annual Seminar (March 7, 2011), at 9, 
available at http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/5bd8d976-2faa-490a-86a1-
ac2265dd9bc4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/cbc992cb-aa02-42d1-95a9-
b019dc56ede3/Recent%20Developments%20in%20the%20Law%20of%20Insider
%20Trading%20and%20Material%20Nonpublic%20Information.pdf (noting that 
“the SEC continues to push the envelope of materiality in its insider trading 
program”). 
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enforcement biases.53 In general, enforcement agents believe it is 
in their best interest to preserve discretion by leaving materiality 
and other key concepts and terms vague and by self-defining these 
words and terms to suit their needs as the time arises. In 
commenting on a recent case, Professor Peter Henning aptly 
summarizes the relationship between the SEC and enforcement 
discretion relating to materiality in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions: 
The S.E.C. takes an aggressive view of materiality. . . . It 
has avoided drawing any clear lines around what is—and is 
not—material information about mergers and acquisitions 
because that might encourage trading by those who learn 
about a potential deal in the early stages. For the S.E.C., all 
information is potentially material, and a flexible approach 
is in its interest.54 
 
The relationship between unclear regulation and enforcement 
discretion is advantageous to federal agencies charged with 
enforcing the law in the areas of regulatory mandate. It allows 
enforcement agents to use enforcement as a regulatory tool. As a 
result, the desire for broad enforcement discretion is not unique to 
insider trading regulation or the SEC.55 The obvious benefit of 
                                                                                                             
 53. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About 
Equal Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247 
(2003). 
 54. Peter J. Henning, The Materiality of Merger Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK, Apr. 4, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/04/04/the-
materiality-of-merger-negotiations/. 
 55. See, e.g., John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual 
Evolution of an Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL’Y 
25, 34 (2012) (“[E]ven the most basic elements of the FCPA, like what 
constitutes a ‘bribe’ or who is considered a ‘foreign official,’ remain largely 
undefined. As a result, it would appear that prosecutors are unfettered in their 
discretion to extend the boundaries of FCPA interpretation to fit the facts and 
circumstances of any particular investigation.”); John S. Baker, Jurisdictional 
and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal Crimes, 
54 AM. U.L. REV. 545, 570 (2005) (“Congress has left great discretion to the 
Executive in prosecution by enacting broad and often ambiguous criminal 
statutes.”); Michael S. Kelley, “Something Beyond”: The Unconstitutional 
Vagueness of Rico’s Pattern Requirement, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 331, 392 (1991) 
(“RICO’s pattern requirement threatens fifth amendment freedoms by 
combining an ambiguous term with a statute granting tremendous discretion to 
prosecutors and private plaintiffs.”); Joan H. Krause, Medical Error as False 
Claim, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 181, 197 (2001) (“The current health care 
regulatory environment is characterized by ambiguous rules that do not 
adequately address the realities of the health care market, relying on 
prosecutorial discretion to distinguish improper activities from harmless (or 
even efficient) behavior.”); Michael J. Malinowski, Globalization of 
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enforcement discretion in this context is that it affords enforcement 
agents the opportunity to mold their enforcement strategies and 
efforts to fit new, unforeseen factual contexts. 
It is possible for an enforcement agent to have too much 
discretion, however. More is not necessarily better. The Initial 
Materiality Article raises questions in this regard based on 
shareholder value considerations.56 Vagueness in applied 
materiality doctrine may also raise other economic efficiency 
concerns and may weaken, rather than strengthen, the deterrence 
value of the regulatory regime.57 While some efficient, desirable 
securities transactions will go forward despite the risk of potential 
enforcement, many will be discouraged by that risk. An efficacious 
insider trading regime under current U.S. law should enable 
                                                                                                             
 
Biotechnology and the Public Health Challenges Accompanying It, 60 ALB. L. 
REV. 119, 169 (1996) (“[A]ccording to some accounts, FDA officials have all 
the power and discretion they need, and this discretion is enhanced by the 
ambiguity of the regulations they enforce.”). 
 56. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1172–90. 
 57. Various scholars have written on this point. I will share the thoughts of 
two here. Professor Marlene O’Connor notes that  
a specific rule enhances the efficiency of a deterrence strategy in two 
ways. First, precise regulations have an impact on the cost side of the 
potential violator’s risk-reward equation. Because a specific rule 
employs very few factual issues to determine whether certain activity is 
illegal, it increases the likelihood that the defendant’s conduct will fall 
within its narrow parameters and thus be deemed illegal. In addition, 
because a specific rule does not provide for discretionary exceptions, it 
also raises the probability that the defendant will be convicted for 
engaging in the illegal activity. Second, a specific rule reduces the 
amount of resources the enforcement system consumes in prosecuting 
violators. A precise rule promotes deterrence and decreases the number 
of violations that occur; thus it lowers the amount of resources required 
for the detection of the illegal activity and the total number of cases 
brought before the judicial system. Specific regulation also conserves 
judicial resources, because cases concerning a specific rule involve 
only a few factual issues that take less time to litigate. Given only a 
limited number of facts to dispute, parties can more accurately predict 
the outcome of litigation; thus, a specific rule also increases the 
likelihood that parties will settle their disputes outside the court system. 
Marleen A. O’Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: 
The Repeal of Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 359 (1989) (footnotes 
omitted). Professor Dru Stevenson raises a similar point, noting that “[w]hen 
people feel the law or sanctions are not just unknown, but unknowable, they will 
either be overly cautious and reclusive (avoiding too many useful activities) due 
to the ‘chilling effect,’ or overly careless about the consequences of their 
actions, creating significant externalities for society.” Dru Stevenson, Toward a 
New Theory of Notice and Deterrence, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1535, 1547–1548 
(2005). 
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enforcement against those in positions of trust and confidence who 
desire to misuse significant, market-relevant information by 
appropriating it for personal benefit rather than releasing it to the 
market—no more, no less. When the breadth of enforcement 
discretion creates collateral damage (in terms of economic 
inefficiencies, deterrence failures, or otherwise) and that 
enforcement discretion can be constrained without compromising 
the efficacy of the scheme of regulation, then rule makers should 
consider placing appropriate limits on enforcement discretion.58  
D. Decreasing Enforcement Discretion Through Materiality 
Guidance 
While a bright-line materiality definition would certainly cabin 
enforcement discretion in insider tradition regulation (and be a 
likely candidate for judicial deference), this article does not argue 
for a bright-line rule. Instead, this article contends that materiality 
guidance can be formulated based on a series of presumptions 
derived from existing decisional law, agency pronouncements, and 
scholarly commentary. Although this article offers guidance only 
in two common insider trading scenarios, similar guidance could 
be constructed over time to address other facts and circumstances 
giving rise to potential insider trading claims. The overall idea is to 
provide individuals who possess material nonpublic information in 
a duty-bound context with more certain, predictable, consistent 
instructions on how to conduct their trading activities—activities 
that may contribute to healthy, efficient capital markets. Currently, 
these desirable trading activities may be avoided in an abundance 
of caution.59 
The Initial Materiality Article proposes a method for 
constructing the desired materiality guidance.60 This proposal 
required that the proponent of the guidance: (1) isolate factual 
circumstances in the insider trading context in which materiality 
guidance routinely is needed; (2) identify the elements of 
materiality that are operative under those circumstances and the 
ways in which the materiality of each element is measured (based 
                                                                                                             
 58. Accord Ashcroft & Ratcliffe, supra note 55, at 34 (“While it is 
understood that laws are rarely black and white, our adversarial system of justice 
is not well served when the roles of prosecutor and judge are combined, and 
where the resulting law remains perpetually gray. For corporate America, the 
dilemma is obvious—it is difficult for any company to ensure that its employees 
and business partners will act ethically and legally when it is unclear which 
actions will trigger [a] . . . violation.”). 
 59. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1174–77. 
 60. Id. at 1193. 
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on the applicable legal standard and existing line-item disclosure 
rules and decisional law); and (3) incorporate each materiality 
element and measurement technique into guidance on materiality 
applicable to the isolated factual circumstances.61 
The Initial Materiality Article leaves two important items for 
future resolution, however. First, it does not resolve which federal 
rulemaking institution would or should adopt specific proposals for 
materiality guidance in the insider trading context, stating that 
“[w]hether that guidance comes in the form of legislation, SEC 
rulemaking, SEC interpretive advice, or (at a bare minimum) more 
methodical, rigorous decision-making in the courts, enhanced 
guidance is warranted.”62 In fact, the Initial Materiality Article 
expressly indicates that this question of comparative institutional 
choice could be resolved in a separate scholarly work.63 
Accordingly, in a subsequent article (the “Institutional Choice 
Article”), this author began to take on that task by proposing a 
standardized framework for making comparative institutional 
choice decisions in federal corporate governance rulemaking 
(including insider trading rulemaking).64 This framework involves 
comparative institutional analyses in four separate areas: 
institutional capacity—power, authority, and jurisdiction;65 
structural and substantive institutional competence;66 institutional 
influence and bias;67 and pecuniary cost.68 The Institutional Choice 
Article does not expressly address, however, the application of the 
suggested framework to a specific proposal for additional guidance 
on materiality in insider trading law. 
Second, largely because the Initial Materiality Article does not 
resolve essential issues of comparative institutional choice, it fails 
to recommend the specific type and content of the proposed 
enhanced materiality guidance. Instead, using the method it 
outlines, the Initial Materiality Article suggests the possible 
substantive and procedural contents of materiality guidance in two 
sets of factual circumstances: irregularities in balance sheet 
accounting and failed merger discussions.69 These suggestions 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 1191–92. 
 63. Id. at n.219. 
 64. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right 
Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 225 (2005). 
 65. Id. at 248–62. 
 66. Id. at 262–307. 
 67. Id. at 307–32. 
 68. Id. at 332–48. 
 69. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1199–1210. 
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require refinement, enhancement, and institutional packaging 
before they can constitute formal proposals for legal change. 
This article engages in that refinement, enhancement, and 
institutional packaging, and in the process, makes certain 
adjustments to the guidance proposed in the Initial Materiality 
Article. This article also both analyzes and determines the 
appropriate rulemaking body and proposes the form in which the 
materiality guidance should be adopted and published. To 
accomplish these objectives, the article proceeds in four additional 
parts. Part II summarizes, clarifies, and modifies the approaches to 
materiality guidance on balance sheet irregularities and failed 
merger discussions that are suggested in the Initial Materiality 
Article. Specifically, Part II describes detailed processes through 
which materiality can be assessed by relevant actors ex ante and ex 
post in two common factual circumstances (balance sheet 
irregularities and failed merger discussions). Part III then presents 
a comparative institutional analysis, as outlined in the Institutional 
Choice Article, with respect to the proposed materiality guidance 
and concludes that the SEC or, failing that, the courts should adopt 
that guidance. As a result of this outcome of the comparative 
institutional analysis, Part III concludes by describing the current 
political and economic environment in which the SEC is operating. 
Part IV describes the form of a proposed SEC interpretive release 
to implement that guidance, and Part V summarizes and briefly 
concludes. 
II. FURTHER GUIDANCE ON MATERIALITY IN INSIDER TRADING 
REGULATION 
The Initial Materiality Article features difficult, indeterminate 
materiality analyses in two common factual contexts and suggests 
possible structures for enhanced guidance in those two contexts. 
This Part reintroduces those examples and the related guidance 
structures. The guidance structures are expressly intended to 
enable transaction planners,70 litigants, and their counsel, as well as 
enforcement officials and members of the judiciary, to make 
materiality assessments in the two exemplar areas with a higher 
level of certainty. If the guidance is effective, costs incident to 
                                                                                                             
 70. In the Initial Materiality Article, this term is defined to include “any 
issuer of securities, any insiders of that issuer, and their respective advisors on 
any transaction at issue, including without limitation legal counsel.” Id. at 1137 
n.19. Importantly, the Initial Materiality Article and this article both include 
issuers, as well as directors, officers, and others with a relevant duty of trust and 
confidence in the class of potential violators of insider trading law. 
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making materiality determinations should be reduced, vexatious 
litigation challenging materiality determinations should be filed 
less frequently, and if a specious case hinging on materiality is 
brought, it should be decided more easily on a motion to dismiss or 
for summary judgment.71 It is important to note, however, that the 
rules and presumptions comprising this guidance are intended as 
advice and assistance to transaction planners and others, rather 
than (necessarily) as determinants of legal liability. However, it 
also is important to note that the presumptions in the guidance are 
crafted to be within, rather than at the edge of, the range of legal 
compliance. Insider trading compliance plans, for example, are 
similarly crafted to be within the range of legal compliance.72  
The proffered guidance may be adopted by the federal courts, 
Congress, or the SEC—all of which are insider trading rule 
makers. But adoption of materiality guidance through the judicial 
process would occur incrementally through decisional law over 
time (much as it has in the past). The appropriate rule maker for 
and nature of the guidance will be addressed in detail in Part III. 
However, it is worth noting here (in evaluating the propriety and 
efficacy of the substance of the guidance as set forth in this Part) 
that the choice of rule maker may render the proposed guidance 
more or less feasible and more or less legally binding on the 
potential actors ab initio and over time. 
A. Improper Balance Sheet Accounting 
The first exemplar factual context in the Initial Materiality 
Article involves a public company’s reckless financial statement 
error—the understatement of balance sheet reserves, resulting in a 
corresponding two percent overstatement of assets.73 Before the 
error is expressly identified and corrected in public filings, the 
public company’s Chief Financial Officer exercises stock options 
and sells the underlying shares. In this example, there exists a 
concern that the Chief Financial Officer may have been in 
possession of material nonpublic information—the true (lower) 
value of the corporation’s assets—at the time she sold her shares 
into a public market that then had no awareness of the lower asset 
                                                                                                             
 71. Of course, in any given case, other elements of an insider trading claim 
also may be at issue. 
 72. See generally Joan T.A. Gabel et al., Letter vs. Spirit: The Evolution of 
Compliance into Ethics, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 453, 462 (2009) (describing insider 
trading compliance programs); Steven Chasin, Comment, Insider v. Issuer: 
Resolving and Preventing Insider Trading Compliance Policy Disputes, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 859, 861-64 (same). 
 73. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1145–46. 
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valuation. In this manner, she would be deemed to have profited 
personally from the nondisclosure of the adverse corporate 
financial information. 
Having presented this example, the Initial Materiality Article 
proceeds to determine that a materiality analysis based on these 
facts does not result in a clear conclusion. Then, it outlines and 
applies a recommended approach to fashioning more specific 
materiality guidance applicable to these (and other similar) facts. 
The application of this approach results in the suggestion that 
materiality guidance on improper balance sheet accounting, 
could be constructed so that it: (i) renders per se material 
all asset or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts 
exceeding ten percent of an issuer’s total consolidated 
assets (taken individually or collectively for any given 
reporting period), based on the most recently reported 
balance sheet of the issuer; (ii) presumes material all asset 
or liability omissions or misstatements in amounts 
exceeding five percent (but not in excess of ten percent) of 
an issuer’s total consolidated assets (taken individually or 
collectively for any given reporting period), based on the 
most recently reported balance sheet of the issuer (which 
presumption is rebuttable by the trading issuer or insider 
based on a list of specified factors derived from current law 
and regulation); and (iii) presumes immaterial all asset or 
liability omissions or misstatements in amounts equal to or 
less than five percent of an issuer’s total consolidated assets 
(taken individually or collectively for any given total 
reporting period), based on the most recently reported 
balance sheet of the issuer (which presumption is rebuttable 
by an investor plaintiff or prosecutor based on a list of 
specified factors derived from current law and 
regulation).74 
This suggestion was intended to provide a basic framework for 
guidance, but the numerical thresholds at five percent and ten 
percent of total consolidated assets are at odds with accounting 
convention (which is relevant, although not dispositive, to the legal 
assessment of materiality). While income threshold tests for 
materiality typically hover in this range,75 asset tests tend to be set 
                                                                                                             
 74. Id. at 1203–04. 
 75. See Seong-Yeon Cho et al., Measuring Stockholder Materiality, ACCT. 
HORIZONS 63, 64 (2003 Supp.) (“Items less than 5 percent of net income are 
generally considered immaterial, while items greater than 10 percent are 
considered material.”); Mark W. Nelson et al., The Effect of Quantitative 
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at significantly lower thresholds—more in the order of one-half 
percent of net assets. Investor tolerance for materiality may, 
however, be lower.76  
The Initial Materiality Article assumed that there was no 
significant income statement effect caused by the improper balance 
sheet accounting example presented.77 This assumption and the 
related focus on an asset-oriented test for materiality prove to be 
faulty from an accounting point of view. For accountants, 
quantitative materiality typically is gauged by reference income 
statement data, first and foremost, although asset tests may be 
employed in specific circumstances (including where assets are a 
better point of reference because of the nature of the corporation or 
its financial statements).78 That being the case, the suggested 
materiality guidance in the Initial Materiality Article should be re-
cast to focus on income statement thresholds. Accordingly, this 
article re-proposes the suggested guidance for improper balance 
sheet accounting. Specifically, materiality guidance on improper 
balance sheet accounting could be constructed to: (i) render per se 
material all misstatements (taken individually or collectively for 
any given reporting period) in excess of ten percent of the issuer’s 
net income before taxes, based on the most recently reported 
income statement of the issuer; (ii) presume material all 
misstatements (taken individually or collectively for any given 
reporting period) of at least five percent, but not in excess of ten 
percent, of the issuer’s net income before taxes, based on the most 
recently reported income statement of the issuer (which 
presumption is rebuttable by the trading issuer or insider based on 
a list of specified factors derived from current law, regulation, and 
guidance); and (iii) presume immaterial all misstatements (taken 
individually or collectively for any given total reporting period) of 
                                                                                                             
 
Materiality Approach on Auditors’ Adjustment Decisions, 80 ACCT. REV. 897, 900 
(2005) (“[Q]uantitative thresholds such as 5–10 percent of net income have long 
been used in practice”); James Brady Vorhies, The New Importance of Materiality, 
J. OF ACCT. (May 2005), available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/ 
Issues/2005/May/TheNewImportanceOfMateriality.htm (“Working materiality 
levels or quantitative estimates of materiality generally are based on the 5% rule, 
which holds that reasonable investors would not be influenced in their investment 
decisions by a fluctuation in net income of 5% or less.”). 
 76. See Cho et al., supra note 75, at 65 (“We infer from our results that the 
average investor materiality threshold for pretax earnings is between 0.1 percent 
and 0.2 percent. For total assets, we estimate a materiality threshold between 
0.01 percent and 0.025 percent.”). 
 77. See Heminway, supra note 43, at n.246. 
 78. See WILLIAM F. MESSIER ET AL., AUDITING AND ASSURANCES: A 
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 87 (6th ed. 2007). 
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less than five percent of the issuer’s net income before taxes, based 
on the most recently reported income statement of the issuer 
(which presumption is rebuttable by the trading issuer or insider 
based on a list of specified factors derived from current law, 
regulation, and guidance). 
Overall, this guidance represents a more concrete way to 
approach the problem of financial statement misstatements and is 
not inconsistent with the SEC’s Staff Accounting Bulletin: No. 99 – 
Materiality.79  
The use of a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as 
5%, may provide the basis for a preliminary assumption 
that—without considering all relevant circumstances—a 
deviation of less than the specified percentage with respect 
to a particular item on the registrant's financial statements 
is unlikely to be material. The staff has no objection to such 
a “rule of thumb” as an initial step in assessing 
materiality.80 
The reformulated materiality guidance suggested in this article 
accepts the concept of a rule of thumb for quantitative measures 
materiality and provides a specific process for how qualitative 
factors can then be assessed given those accounting industry 
norms. The reformulated guidance, however, leaves undetermined 
the referenced lists of applicable rebuttal factors, the applicable 
standards of proof on rebuttal, and the procedural effects of a 
rebuttal that satisfies the applicable standards of proof.81 These 
matters are addressed in the remainder of Part II.A. 
1. Rebuttal Factors 
Based on existing administrative and judicial pronouncements 
and scholarly commentary, the factors set forth below may rebut a 
presumption of materiality in the event of asset misstatements that 
                                                                                                             
 79. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 
1999) [hereinafter SAB No. 99].  SAB No. 99 is a publication of the SEC’s staff 
that does not represent formal guidance from the SEC but it is used by the SEC 
in its work and is given significant, but not dispositive, weight by the judiciary, 
legal advisors, and transaction planners. See Bondi & Lofchie, supra note 37, at 
181 (“Although the SEC often cites SAB 99 in its pleadings, the bulletin is not 
the adopted view of the SEC (i.e., the Commission has not voted on it). It is 
merely an official interpretation of the staff and, therefore, should not be given 
undue authoritative weight.”). 
 80. SAB No. 99. 
 81. See infra Parts II.A.1 & II.A.2. 
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cause a change of at least five percent, but not in excess of ten 
percent, in an issuer’s net income before taxes: 
• the action (tipping or trading) of the issuer or insider is 
counterintuitive to the misstatement (i.e., the misstatement 
results in a decrease in net income before taxes and the 
issuer or insider acquires shares before the misstatement is 
publicly announced, or the misstatement results in an 
increase in net income and the issuer or insider sells shares 
before the misstatement is publicly announced);82 
• net income before taxes is not a significant factor in market 
assessments of the issuer’s operations or financial condition 
because of, for example, the nature of the issuer’s 
business;83 
• the misstatement relates to a business segment or other 
portion of the issuer’s business that plays an insignificant 
role in the issuer’s operations or financial condition; 84 
• the misstatement arises from an estimate that is inherently 
imprecise at the order of magnitude of the 
misrepresentation;85 and 
• the misstatement results from calculations or measurements 
that, although made with reasonable care, are widely 
known to be, or that have been disclosed by the issuer to 
be, subject to inaccuracies of the type and amount exhibit 
in connection with the issuer’s misstatement.86 
These factors collectively call into question both the relevance and 
the reliability of a misstatement that appears to be, in relative 
                                                                                                             
 82. Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 737 (1989) (“[W]hen an insider is 
buying, projections, asset appraisals, or pending merger negotiations that 
suggest an increase in the price of a corporation’s stock are likely to be of more 
interest to the rational public transactor than unfavorable projections or asset 
appraisals. And when the insider is selling, the undisclosed unfavorable 
information about future prices is likely to be of more interest to the rational 
public transactor than undisclosed favorable information.”). 
 83. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting that, while income 
tests are the norm for quantitative materiality assessments, asset tests or other 
benchmarks for quantitative materiality may be used where the validity of an 
income test is questionable). 
 84. Cf. SAB No. 99, supra note 79 (suggesting that the opposite—“whether 
the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the registrant’s business 
that has been identified as playing a significant role in the registrant’s operations 
or profitability”—may render a small deviation material). 
 85. Cf. id. (“whether the misstatement . . . arises from an estimate and, if so, 
the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimate”). 
 86. Cf. id. (“whether the misstatement arises from an item capable of 
precise measurement”). 
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terms, quantitatively large.87 Relevance and reliability are 
important components of materiality analysis.88 
Factors that may rebut a presumption of immateriality in the 
event of asset misstatements that cause a change of less than or 
equal to five percent in an issuer’s net income before taxes include 
the following: 
• the misstatement relates to a business segment or other 
portion of the issuer’s business that is significant to the 
issuer’s operations or financial condition;89 
• the misstatement arises from an estimate that is inherently 
imprecise at the order of magnitude of the 
misrepresentation;90 
• the misstatement hides a change in earnings or other income 
statement effect, especially one that changes income into a 
loss or a loss into income;91 
• the misstatement hides the issuer’s failure to meet publicly 
available financial statement targets (whether published by 
the issuer or third parties);92 
• the misstatement hides illegal activity;93 
• the misstatement hides or constitutes regulatory 
noncompliance;94  
• the misstatement hides or constitutes the breach of a 
“material contract;”95 
                                                                                                             
 87. See Brudney, supra note 82, at 728–32. 
 88. Id. at 731 (identifying and defining relevance and reliability as key 
overarching factors in materiality analysis). 
 89. See SAB No. 99, supra note 79 (suggesting consideration of “whether 
the misstatement concerns a . . . portion of the registrant’s business that has been 
identified as playing a significant role in the registrant's operations or 
profitability”). 
 90. See id. (“whether the misstatement . . . arises from an estimate and, if 
so, the degree of imprecision inherent in the estimate”). 
 91. See id. (suggesting consideration of “whether the misstatement masks a 
change in earnings or other trends” and “whether the misstatement changes a 
loss into income or vice versa”). The use of reserve account estimates as a way 
of adjusting earnings across financial statement periods is a well-known 
accounting technique. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY 
ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS 438 (4th ed. 2002) 
(describing “Cookie Jar Reserves”). 
 92. See SAB No. 99, supra note 79 (suggesting consideration of “whether 
the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus expectations for the 
enterprise”). 
 93. See id. (suggesting consideration of “whether the misstatement involves 
concealment of an unlawful transaction”). 
 94. See id. (suggesting consideration of “whether the misstatement affects 
the registrant’s compliance with regulatory requirements”). 
 95. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2012) (defining material 
contracts for purposes of SEC exhibit requirements); see SAB No. 99, supra 
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• the misstatement is of a kind and magnitude that financially 
benefits the issuer or its directors, officers, or other managers 
at the expense of the issuer’s shareholders, including by 
increasing the directors’, officers’, or managers’ actual, or 
potential future, compensation;96  
• the misstatement evidences a lack of management 
integrity;97 
• the accounting error that resulted in the misstatement 
evidences a material weakness in internal controls;98 and 
• the misstatement is persistent (not an isolated event).99 
The general approach recommended here employs both 
quantitative and qualitative materiality doctrine consistent with 
existing SEC guidance100 and related scholarly commentary.101 The 
accounting literature and ever-evolving decisional law should be 
evaluated for additional rebuttal factors on a periodic basis.102 
                                                                                                             
 
note 79 (suggesting consideration of “whether the misstatement affects the 
registrant’s compliance with loan covenants or other contractual requirements”). 
 96. See SAB No. 99, supra note 79 (suggesting consideration of “whether 
the misstatement has the effect of increasing management’s compensation—for 
example, by satisfying requirements for the award of bonuses or other forms of 
incentive compensation”). 
 97. See, e.g., In re Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163 (1964); see also SEC v. 
Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1978); John M. 
Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an 
Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41, 46–47 (1998) (recounting the 
history of qualitative materiality doctrine); Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on 
Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse Incomplete Disclosure 
Under the Securities Laws, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 30–34 (2011) (recounting 
the history of management integrity issues and materiality doctrine). 
 98. A material weakness is “a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in 
internal control over financial reporting . . . such that there is a reasonable 
possibility that a material misstatement of the registrant’s annual or interim 
financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.” 17 C.F.R. 
§ 210.1-02(a)(4) (2012). Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 focused 
attention on mandatory disclosures about internal controls in periodic reports filed 
under the 1934 Act. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 404, 
116 Stat. 745, 777–78 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006)). 
 99. See Park, supra note 48, at 518 (suggesting, similarly, that “evidence of 
a persistent misstatement might create a rebuttable presumption of materiality 
while evidence that the misstatement is isolated might create a rebuttable 
presumption of immateriality.”); id. at 550–52 (expanding on the presumption 
suggestion). 
 100. See SAB No. 99, supra note 79. 
 101. See Park, supra note 48, at 565 (characterizing his own proposal as “a 
firmer basis for distinguishing the financial misstatements that matter”). 
 102. See, e.g., MESSIER ET AL., supra note 78, at 86 (listing possible rebuttal 
factors in Table 3-5, many of which parallel those in SAB No. 99, supra note 79). 
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2. Standard of Proof and Procedural Effects 
A transaction planner using the proposed materiality guidance 
on improper balance sheet accounting will want to consider the 
standards to be applied in his, her, or its decision-making and the 
standards that may be used to evaluate his, her, or its decision-
making ex post, even if the guidance is offered in the form of 
legislation or agency rulemaking. This involves identifying and 
taking into account the standards of proof in civil and criminal 
insider trading actions and the procedural effects of those 
standards. 
An analysis of the standard of proof applicable to rebuttals of 
the presumptions and the effect of successful rebuttals requires 
understanding the application and operation of presumptions and 
rebuttals in the context of a court action. The standards of proof 
provide guidance to decision-makers in using the proposed 
materiality guidance and also frame potential court analyses if the 
court should be required, or otherwise determine, to adopt the 
guidance in evaluating the conduct of alleged insider traders. 
Courts have different ways of looking at rebuttable 
presumptions in civil cases. Specifically, they 
differ as to the effect that a presumption must be given in a 
civil action and the burden it imposes on the party opposing 
it. There are three different approaches taken by the courts . 
. . . One imposes only a burden of production or going 
forward with evidence to rebut the presumption. The 
second approach requires a more substantial burden of 
proof requirement. The third approach uses both the burden 
of production and burden of proof.103 
Which of the three approaches seems most appropriate in 
connection with the presumptions that operate in the proposed 
materiality guidance on improper balance sheet accounting? 
The plaintiff in a civil action must prove materiality by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Is it sufficient, where an omission 
or misstatement is presumed to be material, that the defendant 
present evidence that a rebuttal factor exists to overcome the 
presumption, or should the defendant be required to prove the 
existence of that factor by a preponderance of the evidence? And is 
it sufficient, where an omission or misstatement is presumed to be 
immaterial, that the plaintiff present evidence that a rebuttal factor 
exists, or should the plaintiff be required to prove the existence of 
that factor by a preponderance of the evidence? Finally, should 
                                                                                                             
 103. THOMAS BUCKLES, LAWS OF EVIDENCE 56 (2001). 
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both presumptions be treated the same way, given that the burden 
of proof is on the plaintiff in a civil action? 
Because the policies underlying the alternating presumptions in 
the proposed guidance on improper balance sheet accounting 
represent a careful balancing of interests (rather than a unilateral, 
fundamental determination to favor one party over another in 
insider trading litigation), the rebutting party in a civil case also 
should have to establish the rebuttal facts by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Accordingly, the establishment of any single rebuttal 
factor by a preponderance of the evidence removes the applicable 
presumption of materiality or immateriality, leaving the case to a 
determination at trial based on all available evidence appropriately 
brought before the court—with the plaintiff continuing to bear the 
burden of proof. The inability of a party to assert, in good faith, the 
existence of any rebuttal factor enables—but does not mandate—a 
trier of fact to find facts consistent with the presumption (i.e., 
against the party entitled to rebut the presumption). In the rare case 
that a rebutting party is able to establish one or more rebuttal 
factors by clear and convincing evidence, the trier of fact may 
determine that the rebuttal is compelling enough to find facts 
contrary to the presumption. Accordingly, putative rebutters should 
secure and preserve any evidence relating to the rebuttal of an 
operative presumption and should evaluate proposed action based 
on the weight of that evidence. 
The application of a per se rule (also known as a conclusive or 
mandatory presumption) or rebuttable presumption in a criminal 
proceeding is not as straightforward as the application of a per se 
rule or rebuttable presumption is in a civil proceeding and may 
raise constitutional issues. Although a thorough analysis of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to say a 
few words about their relevant components at this juncture. 
Under criminal law principles, as even non-lawyers know, a 
defendant is innocent until proven guilty. Criminal actions require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime. 
Accordingly, conclusive and rebuttable presumptions of any 
element necessary to establish a criminal violation are scrutinized 
carefully for their effects on the burden of proof. 
A mandatory presumption is a . . . troublesome evidentiary 
device. For it may affect not only the strength of the “no 
reasonable doubt” burden but also the placement of that 
burden; it tells the trier that he or they must find the 
elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least unless 
the defendant has come forward with some evidence to 
rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. In 
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this situation, the Court has generally examined the 
presumption on its face to determine the extent to which the 
basic and elemental facts coincide. To the extent that the 
trier of fact is forced to abide by the presumption, and may 
not reject it based on an independent evaluation of the 
particular facts presented by the State, the analysis of the 
presumption’s constitutional validity is logically divorced 
from those facts and based on the presumption’s accuracy 
in the run of cases. It is for this reason that the Court has 
held it irrelevant in analyzing a mandatory presumption, 
but not in analyzing a purely permissive one, that there is 
ample evidence in the record other than the presumption to 
support a conviction.104 
The presumptions suggested in the proposed materiality 
guidance on improper balance sheet accounting would be “merely 
a part of the prosecution’s case”105 giving “rise to a permissive 
inference available only in certain circumstances . . . that . . . could 
be ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative proof 
offered . . . in rebuttal.”106 Assuming that the trier of fact 
understands or is instructed that there is a mandatory presumption 
of innocence in favor of the defendant “that controls unless it, as 
the exclusive trier of fact, is satisfied beyond a reasonable 
doubt”107 the facts at issue are material, the suggested 
presumptions should pass constitutional muster. 
However, the per se materiality rule raises constitutional 
questions in criminal actions. Under the proposed guidance, all 
asset or liability omissions or misstatements that cause a change of 
more than ten percent in the issuer’s net income before taxes, are 
material. This rule would act as a conclusive (mandatory) 
presumption if introduced in a criminal action. Accordingly, the 
per se rule should not operate in criminal actions as a conclusive 
presumption. Rather, the per se rule should operate as a permissive 
presumption in that context. 
A permissive presumption allows but does not require the 
jury to infer the elemental fact upon proof of the basic 
facts. It does not relieve the government of its burden of 
persuasion because the government still must convince the 
jury that the suggested conclusion should be inferred 
                                                                                                             
 104. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157–160 (1979) (citations and 
footnotes omitted). 
 105. Id. at 160. 
 106. Id. at 161. 
 107. Id. at 162. 
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based on the predicate facts proved. The use of a 
permissive presumption is constitutional so long as there 
is a “rational connection” between the predicate and 
presumed facts. . . .108 
The establishment of a general per se rule in the proposed 
guidance (and its operation as a permissive, but non-rebuttable, 
presumption in the hands of the trier of fact in a criminal action) 
offers a strong, clear message to transaction planners: proceed very 
cautiously, if at all, in buying, selling, or selectively disclosing. 
B. Failed Merger Discussions 
The second exemplar factual context presented in the Initial 
Materiality Article involves open-market purchases of shares by a 
public company issuer’s directors five to six months after the 
issuer’s rejection of a series of undisclosed acquisition proposals at 
premium prices. Within one month after the directors’ share 
acquisitions, the putative acquirer discloses the earlier acquisition 
offers (in turn, driving up the market price of the issuer’s stock) 
and makes a successful cash tender offer to acquire the issuer at a 
significant premium to the prices paid by the directors.109 The 
insider trading question in these circumstances emanates from a 
concern that the directors may have possessed material nonpublic 
information—knowledge of the existence and terms of the earlier 
acquisition proposals—when they bought their shares from sellers 
in the public market that had no knowledge of those acquisition 
proposals. 
As with the first exemplar factual context, the second exemplar 
factual context does not admit to a simple application of existing 
formulations of the materiality standard. Among the difficulties are 
determining whether the specialized “probability versus 
magnitude” balancing test announced in Basic v. Levinson is 
applicable on these facts and deciding when, if ever, nonpublic 
information regarding acquisition proposals is so distant in time 
that it is immaterial as a matter of law. The materiality analysis and 
the application of the suggested approach to determining 
                                                                                                             
 108. Hill v. Maloney, 927 F.2d 646, 649 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Norvell v. 
Miller, 476 U.S. 1126, 1127–28 (1986). 
 109. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1146–48; see also Evelyn M. Rusli, 
After Deal Talks Sputter, Alibaba and Yahoo Said to Meet Again, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK, March 20, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/after-
deal-talks-sputter-alibaba-and-yahoo-meet-again/ (describing recent deal talks 
involving similar facts).  
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materiality guidance in this area led to a preliminary conclusion 
that 
it may then be sufficient to adapt disclosure guidelines that 
label an acquisition proposal as (a) per se material during 
the time it is actively being considered and for three months 
or six months after it is withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned, 
(b) presumed material after that three-month or six-month 
period until two years have passed since the withdrawal, 
rejection, or abandonment of the proposal (which 
presumption is rebuttable by the issuer or insider based on a 
list of specified factors derived from current law and 
regulation), and (c) presumed immaterial after two years 
have passed since the withdrawal, rejection, or 
abandonment of the proposal (which presumption is 
rebuttable by an investor plaintiff, or prosecutor based on a 
list of specified factors derived from current law and 
regulations).110 
This suggested guidance, in the form proposed in the Initial 
Materiality Article, is incomplete because the term “acquisition 
proposal” is undefined and because the proposed guidance fails to 
choose between the potentially applicable three-month and six-
month periods as the tipping point between per se materiality and 
presumed materiality.111 Moreover, rulemaking since the 
publication of the Initial Materiality Article may call into question 
the two-year period suggested in the proposed guidance; 
accordingly, this author revisited the presumption of immateriality 
that attaches after two years.112 Finally, the guidance proposed in 
the Initial Materiality Article leaves open the referenced lists of 
applicable rebuttal factors for the presumptions, the applicable 
standards of proof on rebuttal of the presumptions, and the 
procedural effects of a rebuttal of the presumptions that satisfies 
the applicable standards of proof.113 These items are addressed in 
the remainder of this Part. 
1. Defining “Acquisition Proposal” 
The suggested guidance in the Initial Materiality Article 
addresses, through alternating presumptions, the decreased 
probability that an acquisition of the target actually will occur 
                                                                                                             
 110. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1211. 
 111. See infra Parts II.B.1 & II.B.2. 
 112. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 113. See infra Parts II.B.4 & II.B.5. 
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following earlier, spurned acquisition proposals. Under the Basic v. 
Levinson “probability versus magnitude” formulation of the 
materiality standard,114 as the probability of occurrence of a 
specific contingent or speculative event decreases, the obligation to 
disclose present facts relating to that event will decrease. But at all 
steps along the way, the probability of the future event occurring is 
weighed against the significance of the event. In defining 
“acquisition proposal,” the guidance instructs transaction planners 
and others in assessing the significance of the future transaction for 
the purpose of assessing its magnitude. 
The Basic Court reminds us that mergers in which a target 
corporation is not the survivor are important transactions to the 
target because the transaction terminates the target’s corporate 
existence.115 But mergers also may be important to the survivor as 
well as the target, and other types of transactions (including 
acquisitions) may, depending on the key terms of the transaction 
(e.g., whether all or a significant part of the corporation is affected, 
the proposed pricing of the transaction as compared to prevailing 
and historical market prices, and other transaction terms), be 
important to an issuer or have an impact on the total mix of 
information available to those trading in the issuer’s stock at any 
given time.116 So, the “acquisition proposal” definition must 
encompass both the type of transaction and its basic terms: the 
object of acquisition, price, type of consideration, availability of 
consideration (financing for cash or debt, authorized shares for 
equity), etc.  
The “acquisition proposal” definition also must describe the 
stage of the interactions between the parties. The Basic case itself 
and the failed merger discussions example used in the Initial 
Materiality Article both address a pre-consensus stage in the 
discussions of a business combination transaction.117 But there can 
be many pre-consensus phases of a transaction, each having a 
different relevance.118 The definition must differentiate among 
them as part of the materiality assessment.  
                                                                                                             
 114. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238–39 (1988); Heminway, 
supra note 43, at 1163–64. 
 115. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (citing SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 
39, 47–48 (2d Cir. 1976)). 
 116. See id. at 239 (advising attention to “such facts as the size of the two 
corporate entities and of the potential premiums over market value.”). 
 117. See id. (“No particular event or factor short of closing the transaction 
need be either necessary or sufficient by itself to render merger discussions 
material.”). 
 118. See generally In re George C. Kern, Jr., Admin. Proc. File No. 3–6869, 
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,142 (June 29, 1987) (in 
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Accordingly, it is important to define the concept of an 
“acquisition proposal” so that corporations and their insiders know 
when and what to disclose, and to do that, the definition must be 
broad. Current mandatory disclosure rules again provide assistance 
and support in constructing the definition. Existing line-item 
disclosure rules require disclosure of various abandoned and 
ongoing change of control and business combination transactions 
in connection with purchases and sales of securities (the same 
circumstances under which Rule 10b-5 is operative). For example, 
an issuer engaging in an issuer tender offer must  
describe any plans, proposals or negotiations that relate to 
or would result in . . . any extraordinary transaction, such as 
a merger, reorganization or liquidation, involving the 
subject company or any of its subsidiaries; [or] . . . any 
purchase, sale or transfer of a material amount of assets of 
the subject company or any of its subsidiaries.119  
Similarly, a third-party tender offeror must disclose  
any negotiations, transactions or material contacts during 
the past two years between the filing person [offeror] . . . 
and the subject company [target] or its affiliates concerning 
any (1) merger; (2) consolidation; (3) acquisition; (4) 
tender offer for or other acquisition of any class of the 
subject company’s securities; (5) election of the subject 
company’s directors; or (6) sale or other transfer of a 
material amount of assets of the subject company.120  
Contracts—especially merger agreements—also circumscribe 
acquisition proposals for the purpose of identifying the obligations, 
rights, and remedies of the parties to the agreement in the event 
that an alternative transaction is presented to one of the parties 
after the contract is signed and before the closing has occurred. 
Two commentators described a provision of this kind in a 
particular merger agreement (the “Stone-EPL Agreement”).  
                                                                                                             
 
which the difference between “discussions” and “negotiations” was important in 
determining disclosure obligations); see also Steven G. Sanders, Comment, 
Line-Item Disclosure Provisions and the Materiality of Preliminary Merger 
Negotiations After In re George C. Kern, Jr., 59 BROOK. L. REV. 175, 224–25, 
227 (1993). 
 119. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1006(c)(1)–(2) (2012) (referenced in Item 6 of 
Schedule TO). 
 120. 17 C.F.R. § 229.1005(b) (incorporated into Item 5 of Schedule TO). 
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The Stone-EPL Agreement defined third-party acquisition 
proposal as “‘an inquiry, offer or proposal’ . . . in which the 
third party would acquire 30% or more of EPL.”121 
Contract definitions like this one abound in merger and acquisition 
agreements and take various forms. For example, a recent merger 
agreement that used the term (as it commonly is used) in no-shop, 
non-solicitation, and change of recommendation provisions 
defined the term this way: 
An “Acquisition Proposal” shall mean any proposal or offer 
. . . for (i) a merger, reorganization, share exchange, 
consolidation, business combination, joint venture, 
partnership, recapitalization, dissolution, liquidation or 
similar transaction involving Company and/or any 
Subsidiary or Subsidiaries of the Company whose business 
or businesses constitute twenty-five percent (25%) or more 
of the assets, revenues or earnings of Company and its 
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, (ii) an acquisition of assets 
of Company and/or its Subsidiaries equal to twenty-five 
percent (25%) or more of the consolidated assets of 
Company and its Subsidiaries or to which twenty-five 
percent (25%) or more of Company’s revenues or earnings 
on a consolidated basis are attributable (iii) an acquisition 
of 25% or more of the outstanding Company Common 
Stock, or (iv) a tender offer or exchange offer that, if 
consummated, would result in any person or “group” (as 
defined under Rule 13(d) of the Exchange Act) beneficially 
owning 25% or more of the outstanding Company 
Common Stock.122  
Another recent merger agreement took a different approach, 
separating the acquisition proposal definition from a definition of 
an acquisition transaction. 
. . . “Acquisition Proposal” shall mean any offer or 
proposal (other than an offer or proposal made or submitted 
by Parent or any of its Subsidiaries) contemplating or 
otherwise relating to any Acquisition Transaction. 
                                                                                                             
 121. Amy Y. Yeung & Charles B. Vincent, Delaware’s “No-Go” Treatment 
of No-Talk Provisions: Deal-Protection Devices after Omnicare, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 311, 317 (2008). 
 122. Agreement and Plan of Merger, Parlux Fragrances, Inc., Perfumania 
Holdings, Inc., and PFI Merger Corp., December 23, 2011, § 5.3(i), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/880460/000088046011000020/ex21the
mergeragreement.htm. 
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. . . “Acquisition Transaction” shall mean any transaction or 
series of transactions (other than the Merger) involving: 
(a) any merger, consolidation, amalgamation, share 
exchange, business combination, joint venture, issuance 
of securities, acquisition of securities, reorganization, 
recapitalization, tender offer, exchange offer or other 
similar transaction: (i) in which a Person or “group” (as 
defined in the Exchange Act and the rules thereunder) 
of Persons directly or indirectly acquires beneficial or 
record ownership of securities representing 20% or 
more of the outstanding securities of any class (or 
instruments convertible into or exercisable or 
exchangeable for 20% or more of any such class) of the 
Company Common Stock; or (ii) in which the 
Company issues securities representing 20% or more of 
the outstanding securities of the Company (or 
instruments convertible into or exercisable or 
exchangeable for 20% or more of any such class); 
(b) any sale, exchange, transfer, acquisition or 
disposition of the equity securities of any business or 
businesses that constitute or account for 20% or more 
of the consolidated net revenues, consolidated net 
income or consolidated assets of the Company; 
(c) any sale, lease, exchange, transfer, license, 
sublicense, acquisition or disposition of the assets of 
any business or businesses that constitute or account for 
20% or more of the consolidated net revenues, 
consolidated net income or consolidated assets of the 
Company; or 
(d) any liquidation or dissolution of the Company.123 
A combination of the ideas in the two different tender offer 
disclosures and the contract-based definitions, as well as common 
legal and practical knowledge, creates a comprehensive definition 
of “acquisition proposal” for use in materiality guidance in this 
area. An acquisition proposal exists with respect to a particular 
issuer when there are plans, proposals, negotiations, transactions, 
or similar contacts between the issuer and an affiliated or 
unaffiliated third party concerning any:  
• election of the issuer’s directors; 
• dissolution or liquidation of the issuer; 
                                                                                                             
 123. Agreement and Plan of Merger, Ebay Inc., Gibraltar Acquisition Corp., 
and GSI Commerce, Inc., March 27, 2011, at Exhibit A, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000119312511082907/dex21.
htm.  
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• merger, consolidation, statutory share exchange,124 
amalgamation, tender offer (or other share purchase), 
exchange offer, acquisition of assets, other business 
combination, recapitalization, reorganization, joint venture, 
partnership, or similar transaction that results in the 
issuance, conversion, or exchange of a significant 
percentage of the outstanding securities of any class of the 
issuer’s securities or that impacts a significant percentage 
of the assets, revenues, or earnings of the issuer and its 
subsidiaries (if any), taken as a whole; 
• tender offer for or other acquisition of a significant 
percentage of any class of the issuer’s securities by the 
third party; or  
• sale, exchange, transfer, license, sublicense, divestiture, or 
other disposition of a significant percentage of assets of the 
issuer.  
Significant percentage may be defined as a specific percentage 
(e.g., 20% or 25%, as it is in the merger agreement example) or it 
may be left undefined (providing less definitive guidance to the 
putative actors). 
Given the per se materiality component of the recommended 
materiality guidance, the word “inquiry” was omitted from the 
definition because its use would cause a mere inquiry about a 
transaction—regardless of its magnitude to the issuer—to be 
material under the per se part of the proposed guidance. That result 
would appear to disrespect the Court’s guidance on balancing 
probabilities and magnitudes in Basic125 (since a mere inquiry 
about a transaction indicates a low probability that the transaction 
will occur) and would be unduly burdensome for transaction 
planners. The word “material” as used in other definitions also was 
omitted in favor of other methods of indicating significance. This 
was done to avoid using the concept of materiality to define 
materiality in the broader context. 
2. Per se Materiality Period 
Based on current trends in U.S. securities regulation, the 
applicable per se materiality period should be six months. The 
Initial Materiality Article noted two touchstones for the three-
month or six-month period separating per se materiality from 
                                                                                                             
 124. This business combination transaction is available in states adopting the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 11.03 
(2002). 
 125. See supra text accompanying notes 40–41. 
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presumed materiality: the three-month affiliate rule then included 
in Rule 144(k) under the 1933 Act126 and the six-month strict 
liability profit disgorgement rule of Section 16(b) of the 1934 
Act.127 The more conservative six-month period is more closely 
tied to the policy underpinnings of U.S. insider trading regulation. 
Since the Initial Materiality Article was published, Rule 144 
has been amended (in 2007, effective in 2008) to delete former 
Rule 144(k) and replace it with three-month requirements in Rule 
144(b)(1)(i) and (ii).128 This requirement, together with the 90-day 
affiliate references in Rule 144(b)(2) relating to the ability of 
affiliates to be deemed underwriters and create underwriter status 
in others,129 indicates that periods of approximately three months 
may be appropriate benchmarks for SEC and public concerns 
about the use of nonpublic information by affiliates in the public 
markets. It appears the SEC has determined that after three months, 
the salience of an affiliate’s information has dissipated to the point 
that all relevant constituencies should be content to treat the 
affiliate as if he or she were a non-affiliate. 
The six-month short-swing-profit disgorgement provision 
remains the same as it was when the Initial Materiality Article was 
published. This time period, which is part of an insider trading 
prohibition, may be seen as more directly applicable to materiality 
analyses than the three-month affiliate rules in Rule 144 under the 
1933 Act. Although the six-month period used in Section 16(b) is 
widely criticized in the strict liability context of that rule, the 
period does have some basis as a measuring device in insider 
trading deterrence.130 “Congress apparently believed that the six-
                                                                                                             
 126. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1210. 
 127. Id. at 1210–11. 
 128. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(1) (2012); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 8869, 92 SEC 
Docket 110 (Dec. 6, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-
8869.pdf [hereinafter Rule 144 Release]. 
 129. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(2). 
 130. See generally Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus 
Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 
2088 (1994) (asserting that the six-month period in Section 16(b) discourages 
insider trading by forcing insiders to hold onto securities under circumstances in 
which they might otherwise trade sooner). Professor Jesse Fried notes that 
Section 16(b) . . . is still believed to serve three useful purposes: (1) it 
reduces insiders’ ability to profit from short-term stock price 
fluctuations, better enabling them to focus their attention on the long-
term performance of the firm; (2) it makes it more difficult for insiders 
to exploit Rule 10b-5’s limitations by unfairly using sub-material inside 
information; and (3) it reduces insiders’ incentives to manipulate the 
information transmitted by the corporation in order to make short-term 
trading profits. 
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month period would capture virtually all transactions in which 
there might be an opportunity to profit from the use of inside 
information.”131 Moreover, director and officer insiders under 
Section 16(b), unlike affiliates under Rule 144, remain restricted in 
their trading for up to six months after their insider status 
terminates (until six months after an opposite trade made before 
termination of director or officer status).132 These six-month 
periods evidence decreased concern on the part of Congress and 
the SEC that information gained from privileged positions is 
important after six-months has passed.  
Six-month rules of thumb in U.S. securities regulation are 
prevalent (though not always fully explainable or defensible). The 
2007 amendments to Rule 144 shortened the holding period for 
resales of restricted securities of public company issuers (reporting 
issuers, for purposes of the 1934 Act) to as little as six months, as 
long as certain other requirements, including the public 
information requirements in Rule 144(c)(1), have been met).133 
Also, certain offers or sales of securities made within six months of 
each other are presumptively integrated for purposes of exemptions 
and safe harbors from registration under Rule 147,134 Regulation 
D,135 and Regulation A.136 Although these rules have little to do 
with the relative staleness of information acquired by corporate 
affiliates or insiders, each is a rule that engages temporal proximity 
to identify (among other things) the proper mix of available 
information that should be considered when determining the 
required disclosure of a particular matter (here, an offering of 
                                                                                                             
 
Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through 
PreTrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 362 (1998). 
 131. Michael H. Dessent, Weapons to Fight Insider Trading in the 21st 
Century: A Call for the Repeal of Section 16(b), 33 AKRON L. REV. 481, 497 
(2000) (footnote omitted); see also Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal 
Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1111 
(1985) (“The legislative history emphasized the need to renew investors 
confidence in the exchange markets by deterring profitable short swing trading 
by insiders or large stockholders presumed to have access to inside 
information.”). 
 132. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-2(b)(1) (“A transaction . . . following the 
cessation of director or officer status shall be subject to section 16 of the Act 
only if: (1) Executed within a period of less than six months of an opposite 
transaction subject to section 16(b) of the Act that occurred while that person 
was a director or officer. . . .”). 
 133. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(i). 
 134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2) (referencing Preliminary Note 3). 
 135. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). 
 136. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(c)(2)(v). 
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securities). The materiality component of U.S. insider trading 
regulation functions much the same way—as a filtering device for 
information required to be disclosed before an insider may engage 
in a trading transaction.137 
3. Two-year Presumptive Immateriality Period 
The Initial Materiality Article identifies a number of bases for 
the conclusion that disclosures relating to prior acquisition 
proposals become stale under mandatory disclosure rules after two 
years.138 These bases remain firm almost ten years later. 
However, advances in information technology continue to 
shorten time frames relevant to mandatory disclosure. In particular, 
as noted with respect to the three-month-versus-six-month analysis 
in Part II.B.2 above, required holding periods under Rule 144 have 
been getting progressively shorter. Specifically, the holding period 
for restricted securities held by non-affiliates was reduced from 
two years to one year.139 Rule 144 provides that specified sellers of 
securities will not be deemed to be underwriters of those securities 
for purposes of the exemption under Section 4(1) of the 1933 
Act,140 a safe harbor from underwriter status. This provision relies 
on, among other things, the length of time that a person holds 
securities acquired from the issuer or one of its affiliates—i.e., the 
length of time that the security has been held by a non-insider. 
Accordingly, the shorter time periods under Rule 144 may indicate 
that the two-year rules of thumb relied upon in the Initial 
Materiality Article’s analysis also should be shortened. 
                                                                                                             
 137. See Heminway, supra note 43, at 1149–50 (analogizing materiality to 
the Hogwarts Sorting Hat from the Harry Potter books). 
Materiality is the Sorting Hat embedded in many disclosure rules under 
the federal securities laws, including the “disclose or abstain” rule that 
operates in the area of securities fraud, including insider trading 
regulation. Where there is a duty to disclose a material fact, whether in 
accordance with mandatory disclosure rules or anti-fraud rules, the 
materiality of that particular fact determines whether an individual or 
entity is obligated to disclose that fact. Either the fact is material and 
must be disclosed, or it is not material and need not be disclosed. Stated 
differently, where materiality is used to qualify a disclosure obligation, 
it is a key device that sorts information required to be disclosed from 
that which is not required to be disclosed. 
Id. at 1149 (footnotes omitted). 
 138. Id. at 1206−08. 
 139. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(b)(1); see also Rule 144 Release, supra note 
128. 
 140. 15 U.S.C. 78d(1) (2006). 
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In a recent action asserting a violation of Section 5 of the 1933 
Act, a defendant made a similar argument that did not prevail.141 
The court noted, among other things, that Rule 144 provides 
“safeguards for investors” that do not exist outside its purview that 
contribute to the rationale for a shorter period.142 Given this result, 
even taking into account that rebuttal factors may act as important 
investor safeguards, this author is hesitant to propose varying the 
two-year period suggested in the Initial Materiality Article. Yet, 
two years after withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of an 
acquisition proposal is a long time. Are there any reasons why the 
fact of an acquisition proposal would be material after two years 
(including at least one full audit cycle)? This author can conceive 
of only a few circumstances, all of which are outlined in Part II.B.4 
below. Materiality would be rare in these circumstances. 
Given the narrow scope of potential materiality of an 
acquisition proposal two years after its withdrawal, rejection, or 
abandonment, it seems appropriate to consider whether a per se 
immateriality rule for the period beginning two years after the 
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of an acquisition proposal is 
more appropriate than a presumption of immateriality. Although 
this idea is appealingly simple, this author has two principal 
reservations about proposing this change. First, guidance that 
institutes per se immateriality discourages the kind of rigorous 
thinking about the market-importance of information that the 
materiality requirement encourages. Instead, a per se immateriality 
rule would act as a black-line materiality rule that allows bad 
actors a means of constructing avenues for opportunistic, self-
serving behaviors. Second, as a related, more specific point, I am 
concerned that the notion of per se immateriality in insider trading 
disclosure guidance might be inappropriately imported to other 
disclosure contexts in which fraud protection in general (and 
materiality as an element of a fraud claim in particular) provides an 
important check on and enhancement to mandatory disclosure (in 
the form of either line-item or gap-filling rules).143 For example, 
Rule 10b-5 compels disclosure of material facts “necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
                                                                                                             
 141. S.E.C v. Big Apple Consulting USA, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-1963-ORL-
28GJK, 2011 WL 3753581, at *7−8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2011). 
 142. Id at *8. 
 143. See Heminway, supra note 43, n.240 (describing the over-inclusiveness 
and under-inclusiveness of mandatory disclosure rules, including line-item and 
gap-filling rules). 
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circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.”144 
Accordingly, the proposed guidance does not include a per se 
immateriality rule for the period beginning two years after the 
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of an acquisition proposal. 
4. Rebuttal Factors 
As noted earlier in this Part II.B,145 the materiality guidance on 
failed merger discussions proposed in the Initial Materiality Article 
includes shifting presumptions as to materiality (starting six 
months after withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the 
acquisition proposal) and immateriality (starting two years after 
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the acquisition 
proposal).146 As was true for the presumptions suggested for use in 
the proposed materiality guidance on improper balance sheet 
accounting, the presumptions suggested regarding failed merger 
discussions are rebuttable based on evidence cutting against the 
presumed conclusion. Accordingly, rebuttal factors relating to the 
presumption that facts relating to an acquisition proposal are 
material between six months and two years after the withdrawal, 
rejection, or abandonment of that acquisition proposal include the 
following facts and circumstances:  
• the offeror made a single acquisition proposal that never 
matured into discussions or negotiations; 
• the issuer has had no contact with the offeror since the 
withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the proposal; 
• based on publicly available information, the transaction that 
is the subject of the proposal is no longer possible;  
• publicly available market-based or third-party valuations of 
the issuer (including the issuer’s per-share or aggregate 
market capitalization) exceed the value represented by the 
withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned offer and the issuer is 
not otherwise a prime target for a third-party acquisition; 
and 
                                                                                                             
 144. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). See also Heminway, supra note 43, at 
1170−71 (“[I]n requiring the complete and accurate disclosure of material facts 
in specific contexts, anti-fraud rules act as gap-filling disclosure rules.”). 
 145. See supra Parts II.B.2 & II.B.3. 
 146. The author notes here, with respect to the two parenthetical expressions 
in this sentence, that it may not be easy to determine, in some factual 
circumstances, when an acquisition proposal is withdrawn, rejected, or 
abandoned. The guidance proposed here and in the Initial Materiality Article is 
not intended to create bright line rules that create absolute certainty for the 
parties on all possible facts. Rather, they are designed to diminish uncertainty to 
transaction participants to achieve greater efficiencies. 
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• the issuer is not in the market for a transaction substantially 
similar to, or with attributes substantially similar to, the 
transaction that was the subject of the acquisition proposal. 
Factors rebutting the presumption that facts relating to an 
acquisition proposal are immaterial when two years have passed 
since the withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the proposal 
include the converse of those listed for presumed materiality. A 
withdrawn, rejected, or abandoned acquisition proposal may be 
material more than two years later if  
• the acquisition proposal had been particularly well-
developed before its withdrawal, rejection, or 
abandonment; 
• there has been continued contact between the parties since 
the withdrawal, rejection, or abandonment of the 
acquisition proposal; 
• the transaction that was the subject of the acquisition 
proposal is still possible; 
• the acquisition proposal valuation of the target exceeds 
other available valuations; or  
• the issuer is in the market for a transaction substantially 
similar to, or with attributes substantially similar to, the 
transaction that was the subject of the acquisition proposal, 
especially if the non-issuer party is the only (or one of a 
few) possible transaction partners. 
Arguably, materiality would be rare but still possible in these 
circumstances. The last rebuttal factor is the most powerful of 
those listed and should carry the most weight in decision-making. 
In some cases, however, the total mix of information in the 
marketplace may include substantially all of the information that is 
important in making an investment decision. That assessment 
would need to be made at the time of the proposed purchase or sale 
or information transfer that could give rise to insider trading 
liability. Said differently, under many circumstances, it would be 
improbable that there would be a substantial likelihood that the 
reasonable investor would find that a failure to disclose the 
acquisition proposal would be important or would significantly 
alter the total mix of available information.147 The proposed 
guidance here does not change those general touchstones of 
materiality law in the insider trading context. It merely affords 
                                                                                                             
 147. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988) (citing 
TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), for this “total mix 
formulation” of the materiality standard). 
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better ex ante certainty for transaction planners and narrows ex 
post enforcement discretion. 
5. Standard of Proof and Procedural Effects 
The standard of proof applicable to rebuttals of the 
presumptions and the effect of successful rebuttals is no different 
for the failed merger discussions example than it is for the 
improper balance sheet accounting example in civil actions.148 A 
rebutting party should have to establish the rebuttal factors in a 
civil case by a preponderance of the evidence. As described above, 
this means that the establishment of any of the rebuttal factors by a 
preponderance of the evidence leaves the case to a judicial 
determination at trial based on all available evidence appropriately 
brought before the court, and the inability of a party to assert in 
good faith the existence of any rebuttal factor enables a trier of fact 
to find facts consistent with the presumption.  
However, the proposed guidance for failed merger discussions, 
like the improper balance sheet accounting guidance, includes a 
conclusive (mandatory) presumption: the per se materiality rule for 
an acquisition proposal during the time it is actively being 
considered and for six months after it is withdrawn, rejected, or 
abandoned. Handling this as a permissive (non-rebuttable) 
presumption, as proffered for the per se materiality rule for 
improper balance sheet accounting,149 should obviate constitutional 
concerns while at the same time powerfully guiding the actions of 
transaction planners and other actors who would turn to the 
proposed materiality guidance for advice and assistance in making 
materiality determinations in the insider trading context. 
III. CHOOSING THE RIGHT RULEMAKING INSTITUTION 
Having fleshed out the substance of proposed materiality 
guidance for circumstances involving both improper balance sheet 
accounting and failed merger discussions, the article now proceeds 
to determine the rulemaking institution that should adopt this 
guidance. Because the guidance is a federal corporate governance 
initiative, three choices emerge: the federal courts, the U.S. 
Congress, and the SEC. As previously noted, the Institutional 
Choice Article provides a framework for making this kind of 
comparative institutional choice.150 The discussion and analysis in 
                                                                                                             
 148. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 108. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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this Part employ that framework and provide a basis for concluding 
that the SEC is the most appropriate institutional body to adopt the 
proposed materiality guidance. Because application of the 
framework shows that the SEC may be the best institution for 
adopting the proposed materiality guidance, this Part concludes 
with a brief discussion of the political economy of SEC rulemaking 
in the current environment. 
A. Comparative Institutional Analysis 
In the next few pages, this Part provides a comparative analysis 
of the potential rulemaking institutions for issuing the proposed 
insider trading materiality guidance. The analysis proceeds in four 
steps, representing the four factors in the analytical framework: 
comparative institutional capacity, comparative institutional 
competence, comparative institutional impartiality, and 
comparative legal transition costs.151  
1. Comparative Institutional Capacity 
The federal courts, Congress, and the SEC all currently share 
capacity for insider trading regulation in the United States. The 
courts have exercised broad jurisdiction over insider trading 
actions under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.152 Congressional 
power to regulate insider trading under the interstate commerce 
clause is similarly broad.153 In principle part, however, the U.S. 
Congress has delegated its power to the SEC in Section 10(b),154 
                                                                                                             
 151. See Heminway, supra note 64. 
 152. See, e.g., John I. McMahon, Jr., Note, A Statutory Definition of Insider 
Trading: The Need to Codify the Misappropriation Theory, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
985, 990 (1988) (referencing “the power of the courts, depending on their 
particular interpretation of Rule 10b-5, to limit or expand the SEC's ability to 
successfully prosecute insider traders and protect the financial integrity of the 
securities market”); Thomas C. Mira, Comment, The Measure of Disgorgement 
in SEC Enforcement Actions Against Inside Traders Under Rule 10b-5, 34 
CATH. U. L. REV. 445, 456 (1985) (“The most widely used enforcement tool in 
insider trading cases has been section 21(d) of the 1934 Act, which provides the 
SEC with authority to bring suit in federal courts to enjoin violations of the 
securities laws.”). 
 153. See generally Heminway, supra note 64, at 248−52 (describing 
congressional power to regulate matters of corporate governance). 
 154. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (prohibiting generally the use or employment 
in connection with securities trading of “any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors” (emphasis added)). 
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the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,155 and the Insider 
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,156 and by 
inaction. The SEC has exercised this authority to propose and 
adopt numerous regulations under Section 10(b), including Rules 
10b-5, 10b5-1, and 10b5-2,157 all of which pertain to insider 
trading. In sum, although all three institutions have capacity to 
regulate the elements of insider trading, including materiality, 
Congress has (1) expressly delegated regulatory authority over 
insider trading to the SEC and the federal courts in various 
legislative pronouncements and (2) has otherwise implicitly left the 
heavy lifting in U.S. insider trading regulation to the SEC and the 
courts.158  
                                                                                                             
 155. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 
1264 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also Liu Duan, 
Comment, The Ongoing Battle Against Insider Trading: A Comparison of 
Chinese and U.S. Law and Comments on How China Should Improve Its Insider 
Trading Law Enforcement Regime, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 129, 137 (2009) (“[T]he 
U.S. Congress enacted several supplementary rules including the Insider 
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA), which authorizes the SEC to ask the 
courts to impose penalties on illegal traders and upon those who tip nonpublic 
information to third parties” (footnote omitted)). 
 156. Insider Trading & Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); 
see also Liu Duan, supra note 155, at 137 noting that “the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA), . . . gives the SEC 
authorization to ask courts to impose a civil penalty of three times the profit 
from illegal insider trading.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 157. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1; 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b5-2. 
 158. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 573 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(Winter, J., dissenting) (“Even the most fervent opponents of insider trading 
must concede that the language of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is at best a 
general authorization to the SEC and to the courts to fashion rules founded 
largely on those tribunals’ judgments as to why insider trading is or is not 
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative.”); Shalini M. Aggarwal, From The 
Individual to the Institution: The SEC’s Evolving Strategy for Regulating the 
Capital Markets, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 581, 590 (“Insider trading law has 
primarily developed through enforcement rulemaking and is prosecuted through 
recourse to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property 
Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 83 (1987) (“Notwithstanding the apparent 
difficulties with grounding an administrative and judicial doctrine of insider 
trading regulation on authorities as ill-suited as Section 10b and Rule 10b-5, the 
lower courts and the SEC proceeded to do just that.”); Larry E. Ribstein, 
Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 125 (1988) (“An 
acorn of vague language in the 1934 Act gradually became the sapling of 
equally vague but broader language in SEC Rule 10b-5 and finally a forest of 
federal anti-fraud law, with a large grove of insider trading law. This process 
happened partly because of judicial and bureaucratic incentives and politically 
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2. Comparative Institutional Capacity 
Typically, the judiciary does not have much expertise in 
securities regulation.159 However, because of the significant 
judicial decision-making that has constructed and refined insider 
trading doctrine in the United States, the federal courts are well-
versed in the law defining and interpreting materiality in the 
insider trading context. Yet, despite this substantive expertise, 
courts are ill equipped, as a general matter, to assemble the 
information and resources necessary to engage in comprehensive 
rulemaking in an area like materiality. A court depends on having a 
case before it that allows it to rule on a particular matter; the 
manner of regulation of the judiciary is, therefore, by its nature, 
unpredictable and incremental rather than regular and 
comprehensive.160 In addition, the judiciary is independent. The 
activities of individual judges across the U.S. District Courts and 
the Circuit Courts of Appeal are not formally coordinated, except 
through stare decisis, when applicable.161 It would be very difficult 
for the federal courts, in spite of their expertise in materiality 
standards in insider trading, to fashion comprehensive materiality 
guidance with alternating presumptions over a range of facts.  
Similarly, the structure and expertise of the U.S. Congress are 
not optimal for the task of adopting and implementing materiality 
guidance in the context of insider trading. Structurally, Congress is 
better equipped to handle the comprehensive rulemaking 
represented in the proposed materiality guidance.162 A bill defining 
materiality in the context of insider trading could be introduced, an 
agenda for vetting the bill could be established, and congressional 
committees could work through the language.163 However, 
Congress has judiciously avoided defining and otherwise 
legislating in the area of insider trading,164 creating doubt about its 
                                                                                                             
 
powerful groups, and partly because the courts had developed no clear 
guidelines that might constrain the growth of the law.”). 
 159. See, e.g., Peter G. Morrissey, Note, Regulating Risk in Financial 
Markets: Private Insurance for Public Funds, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1163, 1174 
(1996) (“Judges rarely have a detailed background in securities trading and 
financial market innovation.”). 
 160. See Heminway, supra note 64, at 292−94. 
 161. See id. at 295 (“[N]ational uniformity may be difficult to achieve as 
across all of the federal districts and circuits.”). 
 162. See id. at 266. 
 163. See id. at 265−66. 
 164. See, e.g., Michael P. Kenny & Teresa D. Thebaut, Misguided Statutory 
Construction to Cover the Corporate Universe: The Misappropriation Theory of 
Section 10(b), 59 ALB. L. REV. 139, 168 (1995) (“Congress has refused to define 
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capacity and willingness to take on the substantive details of 
insider trading regulation (and also raising uncertainty about where 
the definition of materiality for insider trading purposes might fit 
within the existing statutory framework). The level of detail in the 
proposed materiality guidance does not lend itself well to the 
political, partisan, public debate that characterizes the U.S. 
Congress. The proposed guidance was constructed through a 
synthesis and careful balancing of principles from decisional law 
and other resources. This is not the kind of job that Congress does 
efficiently or effectively. 
In addition, although the U.S. Congress has significant 
experience and aptitude in drafting statutory definitions, the 
definition of materiality in insider trading regulation is a highly 
specialized, judicially constructed definition that operates in a rich, 
detailed regulatory construct. This is not, in general, the type of 
matter over which Congress would have institutional expertise.165 
“Of our . . . branches of government, the specialized executive 
regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange 
                                                                                                             
 
insider trading”); Richard W. Painter, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 
Thirty Years Later, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 305, 310 (1999) (“[T]his 
commentator remains concerned that Congress has yet to enact a statutory 
definition of illegal insider trading”); A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 
841, 934 (2003) (“Congress was unable to agree on a definition of insider 
trading.”); Steven Thel, Section 12(2) of the Securities Act: Does Old 
Legislation Matter?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1183, 1198 (1995) (“Congress has 
refrained from defining the law’s parameters. Instead, it has left the formulation 
of the private liability regime to the courts.”); Gregory G. Faragasso, Note, A 
Policy Analysis Of New York State's Security Takeover Disclosure Act, 53 
BROOK. L. REV. 1117, 1142 n.140 (1988) (“The Securities Industry Association, 
along with a number of lawyers, Wall Street executives, and lawmakers, have 
urged Congress to adopt a statutory definition of insider trading.”); Morrissey, 
supra note 159, at 1174−75 (“Congress recognizes that it lacks much of the 
expertise required for detailed regulation of the securities industry.”). 
 165. See Heminway, supra note 64, at 274 (“[C]commentators acknowledge 
that expertise on highly specialized matters of substantive law and regulation 
(including corporate and securities law) generally are outside the actual and 
potential expertise of legislatures, because of the significant experience, time, 
and other resources needed to develop that expertise.”); Note, The Case for 
Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2726, 2739 
(2005) (“Congress lacks the requisite capability and information to make 
efficient corporate law decisions.”); Mary Buffington, Comment, Separation of 
Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United 
States, 50 LA. L. REV. 117, 119−120 (1989) (“Congress does not have the 
necessary expertise and time to devote to specialized areas of regulation. . . 
Congress delegates power to oversee and monitor specialized areas requiring 
expertise, such as securities regulation.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Commission, . . . have more technical capability than the courts or 
legislature.”166 The SEC has the best structural and substantive 
competence for issuing materiality guidance in the context of 
insider trading. 
Judgments concerning what disclosure, if any, . . . should be 
mandated are best made at this stage of the science, not by a 
court under a very general materiality standard, but by an 
agency with finance expertise. An administrative agency − 
the Securities and Exchange Commission − has a technical 
staff, is able to hold public hearings, and can, thus, receive 
wide and expert input, and can specify forms of disclosure, if 
appropriate. It can propose rules for comment and can easily 
amend rules that do not work well in practice.167 
Although the SEC’s reputation as a federal agency has been 
damaged by its failure to detect and prevent major instances of 
securities fraud (e.g., the Bernie Madoff affair) and its contributing 
role in the financial crisis,168 the SEC has undergone significant 
reform efforts leading up to and in the wake of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.169 The Commission is well positioned to deploy its 
reorganized expert staff members to evaluate, enhance, and 
introduce the materiality guidance in a deliberate, accessible 
manner through the appropriate agency channels.170 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 166. Morrissey, supra note 159, at 1175. 
 167. Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 332−333 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 168. Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for 
Regulatory Redundancy, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1309 n.159 (2009) (“The 
SEC’s reputation has suffered badly as a result of the financial crisis and other 
major scandals.”); David P. McCaffrey, Review of the Policy Debate Over Short 
Sale Regulation During the Market Crisis, 73 ALB. L. REV. 483, 518 (2010) 
(“[R]eports regarding Bernard Madoff's fraud and other matters related to the 
financial crisis damaged the SEC’s reputation in 2008-2009, and a reputational 
survey in 2009 rated the SEC lowest of six federal agencies listed.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sustaining Reform Efforts at the 
SEC: A Progress Report, 30 No. 4 BANKING & FIN. SERV. POLICY REPORT 1 
(2011) [hereinafter Progress Report]; Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing and 
Reforming the Securities and Exchange Commission: Lessons from Literature 
on Change Leadership, 55 VILL. L. REV. 627 (2010). 
 170. See generally Jones, supra note 168, at 1308−18 (assessing and 
praising, in relative terms, the SEC’s deliberative rulemaking process in the 
post-crisis era); see also Heminway, supra note 64, at 275−82 (raising similar 
points in the pre-crisis era). 
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3. Comparative Institutional Impartiality 
The federal courts are, as a general principal, the most 
impartial sources of rulemaking.171 Congress is the most likely to 
be subject to influence and bias,172 and the SEC typically is more 
impartial than Congress but less so than the federal courts.173 
Specifically, the accessibility of Congress makes it subject to 
lobbying by various public interest groups.174 Moreover, Congress 
is a highly politicized body.175 These attributes have hampered 
various rulemaking projects in the past few years. The SEC is not, 
however, immune to similar charges. Interest groups, primarily 
those representing the securities industry, may exert powerful 
influence over the SEC,176 and the Commissioners do split 
decisions on some important matters along political lines.177  
The proposal to issue guidance on materiality in the insider 
trading context recommended in this article is not a highly 
politicized initiative. If crafted and promoted properly, it should be 
received as unremarkable (given its objective of clarifying the 
materiality standard within the bounds of existing law and 
regulation) and should appeal to both business leaders and 
investors alike because it balances business and investor 
considerations through per se rules and presumptions derived from 
existing disclosure guidance. As a result, the influences to which 
                                                                                                             
 171. See Heminway, supra note 64, at 327−32. 
 172. See id. at 307−18. 
 173. See id. at 319−26. 
 174. See id. at 313−16; Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National 
Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 831 (2007) (“Familiar public 
choice principles instruct that, as is true any time Congress makes policy that 
affects industry or public interest groups, there is the possibility of capture.”). 
 175. See Jones, supra note 168, at 1302 (“[T]he partisanship and ideological 
rigidity that characterizes Congress in recent decades . . . creates obstacles to 
meaningful substantive debates. These factors limit Congress’s ability to act 
decisively on corporate issues except in times of crisis.”). 
 176. See Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of 
Public Offerings, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 134 (2006) (“[T]he SEC may 
simply invoke ‘investor confidence’ without really meaning it, instead catering 
to the needs of powerful interest groups in the securities industry. Detailing the 
assumptions the SEC makes with respect to investors may help expose flaws and 
inconsistencies in the assumptions and regulatory regime, thereby focusing 
attention on the possibility of other, more public choice motives behind the 
SEC’s actions.”). 
 177. See, e.g., John Reiss & Colin Diamond, Explanation and Practical Tips 
Regarding the SEC’s New Proxy Access Regime, 14 THE M&A LAWYER 1 (Oct. 
2010), available at http://www.wsgr.com/publications/PDFSearch/mal1010.pdf; 
Douglas A. McIntyre, Goldman Sachs: SEC Commissioners Often Vote 3-2 
along Party Lines, 24/7 WALL ST., April 19, 2010, http://247wallst.com/2010/ 
04/19/goldman-sachs-sec-commissioners-often-vote-3-2-along-party-lines/. 
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each rulemaking institution is subject and the biases exhibited by 
each institution are not as important in the choice of an optimal 
rule maker for the materiality guidance suggested in this article as 
other factors. 
4. Comparative Legal Transition Costs 
As a general matter, the costs of legal change associated with 
adoption of the proposed materiality guidance are positively 
impacted by the fact that the guidance works within existing legal 
and practice norms. Few costs differ as across the various possible 
rule makers, except that costs in certain areas will be higher for 
guidance issued through court opinions, because of the slow, 
incremental, uncontrolled fashion in which judicial rulemaking 
takes place. 
Learning costs—the cost of learning the new rule178—should 
be low, as a general matter, given that there is very little new 
substantive information in the proposed materiality guidance; the 
value of the guidance is in the consolidation of that information 
and the process for engagement with it. The purpose and effect of 
issuing the guidance is to clarify the application of the existing 
materiality standard in certain factual settings by making the 
process and result more clear. As a result, the guidance should 
predominantly make clearer and simpler what transaction planners, 
litigators, counsel, and others already should know—or would 
know after conducting targeted research—and assure greater 
consistency and predictability in any resulting thought processes, 
advice, and enforcement. 
The detailed, tailored materiality guidance offered supra Part II 
is designed to minimize uncertainty costs across all institutions.179 
However, there will certainly be identifiable transition costs. For 
example, lawyers and their clients may have to give up or revise 
existing thought processes and systems for assessing the risks 
associated with purchases and sales of securities, balance sheet 
accounting, and acquisition proposals and establish new ones as a 
means of ensuring compliance with the guidance. And although 
“acquisition proposal” is defined in Part II,180 there no doubt will 
be definitional and other interpretive questions that will arise with 
respect to that definition and other, undefined terms and concepts 
employed in the guidance. Also, the burden of proof and 
                                                                                                             
 178. See Heminway, supra note 64, at 334−36. 
 179. See id. at 337−41. 
 180. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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procedural effects components of the guidance181 are difficult to 
convey and apply, which may result in additional learning costs. It 
will be easier to keep the text as clear, coherent, and 
comprehensive as possible if the materiality guidance is issued at a 
single time by one rulemaking institution, i.e., the U.S. Congress or 
the SEC (rather than in individual cases by the federal courts). 
Finally, in clarifying materiality, the proposed guidance may 
inadvertently discourage some transactions that the rule maker did 
not intend to frustrate or encourage some transactions that the rule 
maker did not intend to promote. 
There should be few development and administrative costs in 
implementing the proposed materiality guidance because there 
should be little need for new business standards and tools to assure 
compliance with that guidance. However, issuers will likely want 
to revise their securities trading compliance programs to conform 
to the per se materiality rules and presumptions of materiality and 
immateriality offered in the guidance. The costs of these changes 
will be lower for congressional and SEC rulemaking because it 
would be done comprehensively, all at one time (while judicial 
rulemaking would push toward comprehensive guidance 
incrementally over a period of time). In general, it is more 
distracting and costly to continue to adjust internal and external 
transaction terms and tools in stages. 
Some inter-firm development and administrative costs will take 
time to implement even if Congress or the SEC implements the 
proposed materiality guidance. Merger and acquisition agreements 
and other transactional contracts and instruments may need to be 
modified to reflect the certainty and predictability introduced to 
transaction processes through the proposed materiality guidance. 
Parties will negotiate their new forms, and later regulatory actions 
and court opinions will validate or invalidate those forms. Yet, if 
the materiality guidance were to be undertaken through judicial 
rulemaking, this process would be slower and potentially could 
remain incomplete for quite a long time. 
Finally, error costs likely will occur, as with any new rule. 
Although the substance of the proposed materiality guidance is 
relatively clear and carefully drawn, those who use the guidance 
(transaction planners, litigants, and their counsel, as well as 
regulators, enforcement agents, and judges) will no doubt make 
mistakes in its expression and application. Dispute resolution and 
its attendant costs then will result. These costs, like learning costs, 
are best avoided with careful drafting, regardless of whether that 
drafting is done by courts, Congress, or the SEC.  
                                                                                                             
 181. See supra Parts II.A.2 & II.B.5. 
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5. Resulting Comparative Institutional Choice 
In sum, the SEC has capacity to issue the proposed materiality 
guidance, has the most favorable combined structural and 
substantive institutional competence, is relatively free from 
influence and bias in connection with materiality rulemaking, and 
(together with the U.S. Congress) best minimizes anticipated legal 
transition costs associated with the issuance of the guidance.  
However, given the relative structural competence and impartiality 
of the federal courts, they represent a viable second-choice rule 
maker for the materiality guidance.  Although congressional 
rulemaking is less incremental (which would decrease costs), 
Congress has less expertise than the SEC and the federal courts in 
the area of materiality in the insider trading context.  Also, 
Congress is a more politicized body, which may slow down the 
rule making process and increase costs, even though the materiality 
guidance is unlikely to be a partisan proposal).  The SEC, 
therefore, is the most appropriate rulemaking institution for the 
materiality guidance, and the federal courts are the next-best 
institutional choice. 
B. The Political Economy of Current SEC Rulemaking  
When work on this project commenced, rulemaking under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002182 and the SEC’s 2005 offering 
reform initiatives183 had concluded. The SEC, under regulatory fire 
for much of the new millennium, was in a period of relative repose. 
It was seemingly a good time to suggest new rulemaking. Today is 
another day . . . . 
Commentators on this project have argued, some of them quite 
persuasively, that the SEC is unlikely to engage in rulemaking in 
this area at this time. The SEC has been repeatedly (explicitly or 
implicitly, in different contexts) invited to do so, including in 
connection with insider trading-related rulemaking, and has 
declined the invitation.184 Moreover, the SEC’s current operations 
                                                                                                             
 182. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 183. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 
Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,731 (Aug. 3, 2005). See also Joseph F. Morrissey, Rhetoric 
and Reality: Investor Protection and the Securities Regulation Reform of 2005, 
56 CATH. U.L. REV. 561 (2007) (describing and critiquing the SEC’s 2005 
offering reforms). 
 184. For example, in promulgating Regulation FD (an insider-trading-related 
rule concerning the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information to 
market professionals), the SEC stated: 
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are underfunded and understaffed, and the fulfillment of regulatory 
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (and, more recently, the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups Act,185 or JOBS Act, for short) is a significant 
ongoing burden for the agency.186 The suggestion that the SEC 
engage in new voluntary legislative or nonlegislative rulemaking 
on its own motion is, indeed, likely to be unpopular at the present 
time.  
Two other productive paths are possible. The SEC could, in lieu 
of rulemaking, adopt the suggested materiality guidance as a 
statement of internal policy for use in making enforcement 
decisions.  
Policy statements are nonlegislative rules that tentatively 
indicate how agency decisionmakers will exercise a 
discretionary power. Such rules might, for example, isolate 
the factors that should be considered in making decisions, 
rank priorities, set tolerance levels, explain when 
dispensations should be granted, build flexibility into 
overly rigid rules, indicate what data are relevant, or 
                                                                                                             
 
Some commenters suggested that the regulation include a bright-line 
standard or other limitation on what was material for purposes of 
Regulation FD, or identify in the regulation an exclusive list of types of 
information covered. While we acknowledged in the Proposing Release 
that materiality judgments can be difficult, we do not believe an 
appropriate answer to this difficulty is to set forth a bright-line test, or 
an exclusive list of “material” items for purposes of Regulation FD. 
See U.S. SEC’S & EXCH. COMM’N, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 
Release No. 33-7881, Aug. 21, 2000, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/33-7881.htm (footnote omitted). Rule 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, both insider 
trading rules, also decline to define materiality, even though each rule uses the 
word material. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2012) (defining when a purchase or 
sale constitutes trading “on the basis of” material nonpublic information in 
insider trading cases brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); § 240.10b5-2 
(setting forth a non-exclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has 
a duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the misappropriation theory of 
insider trading). The preliminary note to each rule specifically notes that “[t]he 
law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial opinions construing Rule 
10b-5, and Rule 10b5-1 does not modify the scope of insider trading law in any 
other respect.” Id. 
 185. H.R. 3606, 112th Congress (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf. 
 186. See Heminway, Progress Report, supra note 169, at 9–11 (regarding 
SEC underfunding in the wake of the Dodd-Frank Act).  
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otherwise narrow the available decisional referents that 
must be taken into account.187 
This approach is certain to be more palatable (even if not more 
popular) and, if publicly announced, could have similar positive 
effects not just on the exercise of enforcement discretion but also 
on transactional decision-making. However, this approach still 
requires SEC decision-making and, therefore, the expenditure of 
scarce agency resources. Assuming the SEC is maximizing utility, 
it will weigh the benefits and costs and determine whether the 
former justify the latter.188 In fact, as a federal agency, its 
rulemaking is reviewed for cost-effectiveness.189 This calculus may 
well lead the SEC to forego rulemaking activity on materiality, at 
least at the present time. Accordingly, as a next-best option, this 
article suggests that federal courts engage the type of analysis 
suggested here in adjudicating materiality disputes in insider 
trading actions involving improper balance sheet accounting and 
failed merger discussions as they arise. 
IV. THE RESULTING MATERIALITY GUIDANCE PROPOSAL 
The SEC may exercise one of several options in adopting and 
disseminating the proposed materiality guidance. It could, for 
example, propose one or more new rules (perhaps Rule 10b5-3 and 
Rule 10b5-4) for notice and comment under the APA.190 The 
adoption of legislative rules through the APA notice-and-comment 
process is a traditional and well-used approach for the SEC. 
Among other things, the notice-and-comment process provides 
transparency and enhances legitimacy.191 However, this path offers 
disadvantages similar to those provided by an open, public 
congressional process (although, as an indirectly representative 
body, the SEC should be in a position to control the process and its 
outcome better than Congress). Among other things, the 
deliberativeness of the notice-and-comment process can be costly 
in terms of time and money.192 In the alternative, the SEC could 
issue an interpretive release or policy statement193 because the 
                                                                                                             
 187. Asimow, supra note 18, at 386–87. 
 188. See id. at 404–05. 
 189. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in 
Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335 (2011) 
(describing and critiquing cost-benefit analysis in regulatory review). 
 190. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 191. See Asimow, supra note 18, at 402–03. 
 192. See id. at 403–04. 
 193. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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materiality guidance represents an agency interpretation of a term 
used in existing law (both statutory and decisional) and regulation 
within the ambit of the SEC’s mandate. 
The former (APA notice-and-comment) approach permits a full 
public vetting of the proposed guidance. Yet, that traditional 
approach seems heavy-handed as a means of adopting a set of 
materiality guidelines for use by transaction planners, enforcement 
agents, and others in shaping their actions. The latter approach—
issuance of an interpretive release or policy statement—seems 
more appropriate for this purpose and, if properly drafted as a 
nonlegislative rule,194 may allow the SEC to reduce costs by 
issuing the release without compliance with the APA’s notice-and-
comment process. If the guidance constitutes a legislative rule, the 
SEC will be required to give notice and receive comments before 
issuing a final release including the guidance.195 
Although some may be concerned that the SEC is less familiar 
than the federal courts in working with presumptions or that the 
SEC lacks experience in designing rules that include presumptions, 
the SEC is no stranger to navigating and drafting presumptions.  In 
fact, Rule 10b5-1,196 one of the SEC’s rules on insider trading, 
establishes a presumption of liability for insider trading based on 
an actor’s awareness of material nonpublic information.197 Other 
examples of the explicit and implicit use of presumptions in SEC 
rulemaking abound.198 Accordingly, concern about SEC 
experience in this type of rulemaking is unwarranted. 
                                                                                                             
 194. See supra notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text. 
 195. See generally David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative 
Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276 (2010) (describing and 
addressing aspects of this problem); Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can 
the Amount of Deference Accorded Them Offer Insight into the Procedural 
Inquiry?, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1303 (2010) (same); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
547, 551 (2000) (same). 
 196. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2012). 
 197. See United States v. Causey, No. H-04-025-SS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
39619, *15 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 28, 2005) (“Rule 10b5-1 creates an Adler-type 
presumption that a defendant is liable for insider trading upon proof that he or 
she was aware of the material, nonpublic information when the securities trade 
at issue occurred . . . .”); Newby v. Lay (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & 
ERISA Litig.), 258 F. Supp. 2d 576, 592 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“The rule . . . 
create[s] a rebuttable presumption: a plaintiff makes a prima facie case that the 
defendant is liable for insider trading merely by showing that the defendant was 
‘aware of the material nonpublic information’ when he made the purchase or 
sale of the securities.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
 198. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.19g2-1(b)(2) (establishing a rebuttable 
presumption of control in connection with national securities exchange and 
registered securities association compliance); 17 C.F.R. § 240.19h-1(f)(2) 
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Writing the release will be somewhat tricky, however, because 
of the nature of the information to be conveyed and the nature of 
the audience. The proposed materiality guidance is detailed and, in 
a number of aspects, technical. The audience is diverse, ranging 
from employees to officers and directors of issuers, to legal 
counsel, regulators, and the judiciary. How can an interpretive 
release convey the appropriate level of detail to give useful 
guidance (and minimize the costs of legal change) and at the same 
time reach all of these audiences? 
I propose that the SEC issue the guidance in a question-and-
answer (“Q&A”) or frequently-asked-questions (“FAQ”) format. 
The SEC has written many interpretive releases in a Q&A or FAQ 
format199 and also includes on its website questions and answers 
culled from telephonic interactions between the SEC staff and the 
public (although the last supplement was in 2004).200 The SEC also 
hosts Q&A and FAQ pages on its website about a variety of 
topics.201 A Q&A format allows for the segmentation of complex 
information and the presentation of that information in a user-
friendly manner. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
(2012) (creating a rebuttable presumption of control in connection with certain 
self-regulatory organization notices); 17 C.F.R. § 248.120 (instituting a 
presumption in defining control under Regulation S-AM); 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-
2(a)(14)(iii) (noting a presumption of materiality in connection with record 
maintenance by investment advisers). 
 199. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Commission Guidance on the 
Application of Certain Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, and Rules thereunder to Trading in Security Futures 
Products, Release No. 33-8107, 34-46101 (June 24, 2002), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8107.htm; U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
Regulation of Transfer Agents, Release No. 34-17111 (Sept. 11, 1980), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/1980/34-17111.pdf.  
 200. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Manual of Publicly Available 
Telephone Interpretations, http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml (last 
modified Feb. 2, 2007). 
 201. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Division of Investment 
Management: Frequently Asked Questions About Form 13F, http://www.sec. 
gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm (last modified Sept. 21, 2011); SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, Division of Market Regulation: Answers to Frequently Asked 
Questions Concerning Rule 10b-18 (“Safe Harbor” for Issuer Repurchases), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/r10b18faq0504.htm (last modified Nov 
17, 2004); SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last modified Nov. 14, 2009). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Initial Materiality Article, concluded with the overall 
observation that 
[f]air and honest securities markets, investor confidence in 
those markets, and accurate and complete public disclosure 
in the insider trading regulation context all can be enhanced 
by the adoption of more precise materiality guidance for 
use in insider trading analysis. This guidance for 
determining materiality can be fashioned by creating a 
meaningful overarching process for determining 
materiality, consistent with existing law, and rigorously 
applying that process to common factual settings in various 
areas of materiality analysis. If properly crafted, the 
materiality guidance resulting from this process would 
support applicable policy and enhance predictability and 
certainty in the ex ante and ex post application of Rule 10b-
5 in the insider trading context. Given the desirability of 
fostering market integrity and confidence in the current 
securities trading environment, Congress, the SEC, or the 
courts should take action to provide enhanced materiality 
guidance for use by issuers and insiders . . . .202 
Almost ten years later, nothing has been done to further this 
agenda, despite the fact that, in the intervening time, the SEC and 
the U.S. Department of Justice have engaged in noteworthy 
enforcement of insider trading prohibitions under Section 10(b) 
and Rule 10b-5. Many of these public enforcement activities 
(inquiries, investigations, the commencement of legal actions, etc.) 
have involved the exercise of significant enforcement discretion. 
Uncertainties in the application of the materiality doctrine in 
insider trading actions raise questions about the fair, efficient, and 
effective use of that discretion.203 The materiality doctrine in U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 202. Heminway, supra note 43, at 1212. 
 203. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (concerning the possibility of 
bias in insider trading enforcement); Heminway, supra note 5, at 1046 (“If the 
basis for and substance of insider trading regulation under Section 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 are clarified, enforcement agents will have less opportunity to cloak 
their selective enforcement efforts—including those resulting from bias—in the 
unclear policy underlying and elements of U.S. insider trading regulation.”); 
Heminway, supra note 43, at 1169−70 (“If public and private enforcement of the 
securities laws is to be an effective method of preventing and punishing fraud, 
manipulation, and deception as a means of assuring investors of the integrity of 
our securities markets, then U.S. securities regulation should allow for more 
straightforward identification and punishment of violators.”). 
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insider trading regulation represents a significant area of 
uncertainty. 
The SEC is capable of giving enhanced materiality guidance 
for use in guiding the decision-making and activities of transaction 
planners in a manner that does no violence to—and, in fact, is 
likely to improve—the system of insider trading regulation in the 
U.S. All that remains is for the SEC to develop the institutional 
will and marshal the necessary resources to act on the proposals 
outlined in this article, and others like them, relating to areas of 
uncertainty in insider trading doctrine. This is, unmistakably, no 
small task in the current unsupportive environment in which the 
SEC operates. 
In the absence of that institutional will and those resources, 
federal courts hearing insider trading cases that raise issues 
addressed in the proposed guidance offered in this article can use 
that guidance in their decision making. The federal courts have 
constructed U.S. insider trading law in prominent part and can 
have a role in clarifying the doctrine.  Because the guidance 
offered here distills important concepts from SEC rulemaking, 
interpretations and practices followed by the Division of 
Corporation Finance and the Office of the Chief Accountant, and 
existing federal decisional law, it offers important persuasive 
authority to the judiciary (as well as to transaction lanners and 
legal advisors).  
For all of these reasons, this author’s entreaty to the SEC and 
the federal courts regarding materiality guidance in the insider 
trading context: “Just do it!” 
